Manalastas v. Joie de Vivre Kabuki, LLC

Background

Charisma Manalastas alleged that she was hired in 2016 as a front desk agent for Hotel Kabuki. She alleged that coworker Michael Marquez treated her poorly and threatened to physically assault her after she complained about his work. She further alleged that, after she suffered a lumbar sprain at work in 2021 and sought accommodations, management removed her from the work schedule and later scheduled her to work with Marquez despite her earlier complaints and stated safety concerns.

Manalastas alleged claims under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and California Labor Code section 1102.5. She said she filed charges with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) and received a right-to-sue notice. Hyatt argued that the available documents showed that Manalastas received only a right-to-sue notice from the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), not DFEH. The court had previously granted a motion to quash service and allowed proper service; Hyatt did not contest the later service.

Legal standard

The court applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. At this stage, the court accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and considers whether they plausibly support relief, but it does not accept conclusory allegations or unreasonable inferences as true.

FEHA claims

Manalastas’s FEHA claims included discrimination, retaliation, harassment, failure to prevent discrimination, retaliation, and harassment, failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, and failure to engage in a good-faith interactive process. The court held that she had not plausibly alleged exhaustion of FEHA’s administrative requirements.

The court noted that a FEHA plaintiff generally must file an administrative complaint with DFEH within the required period and receive a DFEH right-to-sue notice before bringing a civil action. The complaint referred to a DFEH charge and notice, but the judicially noticeable documents showed an EEOC charge and an EEOC right-to-sue notice. The complaint did not provide details about a DFEH notice, and Manalastas’s opposition referred only to the EEOC. The court therefore found that she had not sufficiently alleged that she exhausted her FEHA remedies.

The court also held that the EEOC materials could not satisfy the FEHA exhaustion requirement because the administrative charge alleged race-based harassment, while the lawsuit’s FEHA claims were based on disability-related discrimination, retaliation, and harassment. In addition, the court stated that the lawsuit was filed almost two years after the August 27, 2021 EEOC notice, beyond the one-year period the court applied.

The court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s FEHA claims with leave to amend. It directed Manalastas to allege, if supported, that she filed a DFEH complaint alleging disability discrimination, received a DFEH right-to-sue notice, and filed suit within the applicable period. The court stated that if the amended complaint did not address these issues, the FEHA claims would be dismissed with prejudice.

Intentional infliction of emotional distress

The court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s IIED claim. Hyatt argued that the alleged conduct was personnel-management activity and therefore could not be sufficiently extreme or outrageous. The court disagreed at the pleading stage. It held that Manalastas’s allegations—that Hyatt scheduled her to work with a coworker who had threatened her after she complained about her injury and accommodations, despite her repeated requests not to do so—could plausibly support a finding of extreme and outrageous conduct and severe emotional distress.

The court also rejected Hyatt’s argument that the IIED claim was preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). The court explained that the claim might require reference to the collective-bargaining agreement, but it did not require interpreting that agreement. The claim turned on whether Hyatt intentionally or recklessly caused Manalastas emotional distress in retaliation for her disability-related complaints.

Whistleblower retaliation

The court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s California Labor Code section 1102.5 claim. It rejected Hyatt’s argument that the claim was preempted by the LMRA, explaining that whistleblower-retaliation claims focus on the employer’s and employee’s conduct and are not governed by interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement.

Attorney-fee request

The court denied Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s request for attorney fees. Although Manalastas was representing herself when the motion was filed, she stated that an attorney had previously represented her, helped file the complaint, and incurred fees before the representation ended. The court held that, if Manalastas prevailed on a claim for which attorney fees were available, the court could potentially award reasonable fees for qualifying legal services provided in the case.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The FEHA claims were dismissed with leave to amend. The IIED and section 1102.5 claims remained pending, and the request for attorney fees was not stricken. The court ordered any amended complaint to be filed within 35 days of the order, by January 8, 2025.