Barnes v. Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

Background

Cyrus Barnes sued for judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner’s denial of his disability income benefits. Attorney Lewis Insler represented Barnes in the federal-court case under a contingency-fee agreement allowing Insler to receive up to 25% of Barnes’s past-due benefits. Insler did not represent Barnes during the agency proceedings.

The parties stipulated to a remand for further proceedings under Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The court later approved $3,098.06 in fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, a law that allows certain fee awards against the government. After the further agency proceedings, the Commissioner notified Barnes that he had been found disabled and was entitled to $84,283 in past-due benefits. The Commissioner withheld $27,175 to pay a possible attorney-fee request under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b).

Attorney-Fee Request

Insler requested $7,600 under Section 406(b) for 14.16 hours of work in federal court. The Commissioner deferred to the court’s determination of whether the amount was reasonable. The court noted that Section 406(b) permits a reasonable fee of no more than 25% of a claimant’s past-due benefits.

The court found the motion timely because Insler filed it two days after receiving the benefits award notice. It also found that the requested fee did not exceed the statutory cap, and the record showed no fraud, overreaching, or purposeful delay.

To decide whether the fee was reasonable, the court considered the representation’s quality and result, any delay by counsel, and whether the fee would be an improper windfall. It also considered the lawyer’s ability and efficiency, the professional relationship with Barnes, Barnes’s satisfaction, and the uncertainty and effort involved in obtaining benefits. The court concluded that none of these factors supported reducing the fee. The court noted that Insler obtained a favorable result after one remand, spent 14.16 hours on the case, and sought less than 25% of the past-due benefits. The resulting effective hourly rate was $536.72, which the court found reasonable in light of other fee awards discussed in the opinion.

Disposition

The court granted the motion and awarded Insler $7,600 in attorney’s fees under Section 406(b), to be paid from Barnes’s past-due benefits in accordance with agency policy. Because fees had also been awarded under the Equal Access to Justice Act, Insler was ordered, within five business days after receiving the Section 406(b) fees, to refund $3,098.06 to Barnes and file a declaration confirming the refund. Judge Sarah L. Cave also directed the Clerk of Court to close the fee-motion docket entry.