Minnesota Deer Farmers Association v. State of Minnesota, The

Background

The Minnesota Deer Farmers Association and various members challenged Minnesota Statute § 35.155, which regulates deer farming. The challenged provision prohibits new registrations for white-tailed deer farming and permits only one transfer of an existing registration to an immediate family member. The legislature enacted the provision to prevent the spread of chronic wasting disease, which the opinion describes as a deadly, infectious disease found in members of the deer family. The opinion states that farmed white-tailed deer contribute to the disease’s spread and increase the risk of transmission.

The plaintiffs alleged that the statute violated substantive due process and equal protection because they claimed a constitutional right to pursue an occupation and argued that Minnesota treated similarly situated people differently. In an earlier order, the court dismissed the action in its entirety, concluding that farming white-tailed deer was not a fundamental right, that the alleged classifications were not suspect or quasi-suspect, and that the statute satisfied rational-basis review. The court denied the plaintiffs’ earlier motion for a preliminary injunction as moot. The plaintiffs appealed to the Eighth Circuit.

Motion and Legal Standard

While the appeal was pending, the plaintiffs asked the district court to stay enforcement of § 35.155 or issue an injunction. An injunction pending appeal is a court order temporarily preventing enforcement or requiring action while an appeal proceeds. The court explained that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(d) permits a district court to issue an injunction on appropriate terms while an appeal is pending from certain orders involving injunctions.

The court applied the four preliminary-injunction factors: likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm without relief, the balance of harms between the parties, and the public interest. Because the district court had already ruled on the merits, the court focused on whether the appeal presented a substantial legal question and how the equities—the practical consequences for the parties and public—favored either side.

Analysis

The plaintiffs argued that the court should view deer farming as an agricultural pursuit and should give greater weight to Dennis Udovich’s complete exclusion from entering the white-tailed deer-farming industry. The court rejected both arguments. It stated that classifying Cervidae farming as an agricultural pursuit did not make it a fundamental right, and it relied on Eighth Circuit precedent declining to recognize farming as a fundamental right. The court also stated that pursuing an occupation is not a fundamental right protected by substantive due process and that the statute had already passed rational-basis review.

The court recognized that the appeal presented a substantial legal question: whether pursuing white-tailed deer farming is a fundamental right and, if not, whether the legislature acted arbitrarily or capriciously. But it concluded that issuing an injunction would not preserve the status quo. Instead, allowing Udovich and others to obtain registrations could increase uncertainty and the state’s exposure to chronic wasting disease.

The court found that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently shown irreparable harm, which means harm that is certain, imminent, and not adequately repairable through money damages or another legal remedy. The court stated that the plaintiffs were not being denied a fundamental right. Even assuming irreparable harm, the court concluded that the harms to the state and public outweighed the plaintiffs’ potential harm. The court noted that registrations issued before the Eighth Circuit’s decision could become invalid if the appellate court affirmed the district court, while the state could issue new registrations later if the Eighth Circuit disagreed.

Disposition

Judge John R. Tunheim ordered that the plaintiffs’ Motion for Stay or for an Injunction Pending Appeal, Docket No. 45, is DENIED. The opinion does not state that the motion was denied with or without prejudice. The underlying action had previously been dismissed, and this order addressed only the requested relief during the appeal.