Lewin v. Olowokere

Background

Joan George Lewin brought negligence claims against Charles Busayo Olowokere and Pearson Education Inc. for alleged personal injuries from a motor-vehicle collision. The defendants removed the action from New York State Supreme Court to the Southern District of New York based on diversity jurisdiction and filed an answer denying the allegations.

The opinion states that Lewin was driving eastbound on Interstate 287 in Westchester County when a vehicle driven by Olowokere and owned by Pearson struck her vehicle from behind. The opinion identifies Olowokere as a Pearson employee. Lewin moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 on the issue of liability.

The parties’ evidence

Lewin submitted an affidavit stating that she was driving below the 55-mile-per-hour speed limit, reduced her speed to 30 miles per hour while proceeding straight in the middle lane, and was then struck from behind. She stated that she was not using her cell phone and did not suddenly slam on her brakes. She also submitted a photograph showing her vehicle’s tinted rear window.

Olowokere submitted an affidavit stating that he was driving in the course of his employment for Pearson, merged from the far-right lane into the middle lane, and was three to four car lengths behind Lewin when she also merged into the middle lane. He said Lewin suddenly and unexpectedly braked even though no vehicles were ahead of her. He also said that he saw Lewin holding a phone shortly before the collision.

Court’s analysis

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute about a fact that matters to the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Because the case was based on diversity jurisdiction and the accident occurred in New York, the court applied New York substantive law.

Under New York law, a rear-end collision with a slowing or stopping vehicle establishes an initial showing of negligence by the rear vehicle’s driver. After Lewin showed that Olowokere’s vehicle struck her from behind, Olowokere had to provide a non-negligent explanation for the collision.

The court held that Olowokere’s assertion that Lewin suddenly stopped, standing alone, was insufficient. The court also rejected the assertion that Lewin had a phone in her hand. It concluded that the phone allegation did not explain how the collision occurred or create a factual issue requiring a trial. The court relied on Lewin’s denial and the photograph of the tinted rear window in finding that the allegation was unsupported by the required concrete evidence.

The court further held that Pearson was liable. Under New York’s rule making an employer responsible for an employee’s negligence committed within the scope of employment, Pearson could be held liable because Olowokere stated that he was working for Pearson when the collision occurred. The court also applied New York’s vehicle-owner liability rule, reasoning that Olowokere’s statement implicitly showed Pearson’s consent to his use of the vehicle.

Disposition

The court granted Lewin’s motion for summary judgment on liability against both defendants. The clerk was directed to terminate the motion. The parties were directed to meet and confer and submit a new case-management plan by January 14, 2025, after which the court would refer the matter to a magistrate judge for pretrial matters.