Lloyd v. Facebook, Inc.

Background

Susan Lloyd sued Facebook, Inc. and Mark Zuckerberg over several claims involving allegations that Facebook was inaccessible to disabled persons and that third parties had repeatedly harassed and threatened her on Facebook. The claims included violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the California Unruh Act; fraud and intentional misrepresentation; invasion of privacy; breach of contract; negligence; and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

The breach-of-contract claim was based on Facebook’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, now known as Meta’s Terms of Service. Lloyd alleged that the document required Facebook to address third-party threats and harassment. She relied on statements that Facebook was committed to making the platform safe, protecting privacy, preventing harassment, and removing certain threatening or harmful content.

The court had previously dismissed Lloyd’s claims and entered final judgment for the defendants. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims except the breach-of-contract claim. It reversed the dismissal of that claim because the earlier dismissal had been based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit remanded the contract claim for further proceedings.

Rule 12(b)(6) motion

On remand, the defendants renewed their motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim for relief. The court considered whether Lloyd’s amended allegations plausibly showed that Facebook breached a contract.

Contract claim

The court held that the claim in the third amended complaint was nearly the same as the earlier version and still failed to identify a specific contract provision or promise that Facebook breached. Under the court’s explanation of California law, a breach-of-contract claim requires a contract, the plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, a breach by the defendant, and resulting damages.

The court distinguished a specific contractual promise from a general monitoring policy. It concluded that Facebook’s statements about safety, privacy, harassment, and removing harmful content were general policy statements rather than a clear, well-defined promise that could support contract liability. The court also rejected Lloyd’s argument that Facebook was relying on different terms of service from those in effect when the alleged incidents occurred, stating that she still had to identify a specific contractual provision or promise.

Communications Decency Act

The court also stated that Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act barred Lloyd’s claim. That provision generally prevents treating an interactive computer service as the publisher or speaker of information provided by another person. The court explained that liability is barred when the duty allegedly violated derives from the defendant’s role or conduct as a publisher or speaker, including decisions about removing third-party content.

The court rejected Lloyd’s argument that Section 230 protection does not apply when third parties make serious threats, such as threats of murder or rape. It stated that neither the statutory language nor the cited case law makes protection depend on the type of third-party speech involved.

Disposition

The court dismissed Lloyd’s breach-of-contract claim with prejudice because she had previously been given an opportunity to correct the deficiency and had essentially repeated the same allegations. It ordered the clerk to enter final judgment and close the case.