Prescott v. Contra Costa County
- Haywood Gilliam
- 4:24-cv-01660
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 9
In Prescott v. Contra Costa County, Judge Gilliam granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the § 1983 claims for insufficient factual allegations.
Emarieay Prescott’s § 1983 claims against Contra Costa County and the Contra Costa County Sherriff’s Office were dismissed under the court’s ruling that the complaint did not adequately plead municipal liability. The unidentified Doe defendants remained subject to the requirement that Prescott identify and serve them, or face dismissal without prejudice. The case was stayed through March 14, 2025, and the court administratively closed it during the stay.
What happened
In Prescott v. Contra Costa County, Emarieay Prescott alleged that a deputy failed to protect him from an inmate attack and that his later medical complaints were ignored, causing permanent eye damage. He also alleged that the County had inadequate policies and training.
The court found that Prescott had not provided enough facts to support municipal liability against Contra Costa County or the Contra Costa County Sherriff’s Office. The court also addressed the unidentified Doe defendants, who had not been identified or served.
Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. granted the motion to dismiss. The court stayed the case through March 14, 2025, including entry of judgment and the deadline to serve the Doe defendants; those defendants would be dismissed without prejudice if they were not identified and served.
The detailed version
- Prescott v. Contra Costa County · No. 4:24-cv-01660
- Haywood Gilliam
- Dec. 12, 2024
Background
Emarieay Prescott alleged that on March 18, 2020, while awaiting trial at Contra Costa County’s West County Detention Facility, other inmates attacked him in his cell. He alleged that a deputy saw the attack but did not intervene. Prescott was taken to a hospital, where he was diagnosed with a fracture around his right eye. He later submitted grievance slips seeking additional examination because he had difficulty seeing, but he alleged that the requests were ignored for several months. He said that follow-up care revealed permanent damage and that medical staff told him earlier treatment could have saved his eyesight.
Prescott brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute, alleging failure to protect him from the attack and deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. He also alleged that Contra Costa County had customs, policies, or practices allowing deputies to ignore inmate grievances and fail to provide medical assistance, and that the County failed to train its employees.
This was the second motion to dismiss. In an earlier order, the court found that Prescott’s claims were not barred by the statute of limitations but concluded that he had not adequately pleaded a municipal-liability claim. Prescott then filed an amended complaint. The opinion states that Prescott was represented by counsel.
Rule 12(b)(6) standard
The defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. At this stage, the court accepts factual allegations as true and views them favorably to the plaintiff, but the complaint must contain enough facts to make the claim plausible rather than merely possible.
Claims against the County and Sheriff’s Office
The court explained that under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 merely because it employs someone who allegedly violated the Constitution. A plaintiff must plausibly allege that the municipality’s own policy, custom, failure to train, or final policymaker caused the constitutional injury.
As to the Contra Costa County Sherriff’s Office, the court found that Prescott had identified no allegations supporting a Monell claim against that entity. The court therefore granted the motion to dismiss as to the Sherriff’s Office.
As to Contra Costa County, the court held that Prescott’s allegations about customs, policies, and practices were too general. He alleged, largely on information and belief, that the County lacked protocols, allowed deputies not to protect detainees, ignored grievances, and failed to provide medical care. But he provided no supporting facts showing a persistent and widespread practice. The court stated that a single incident was not enough to establish liability based on a longstanding custom or practice.
The court recognized that a single incident can sometimes support a claim based on an unconstitutional municipal policy, including a policy of inaction. But it held that Prescott had not alleged facts plausibly showing that the incident resulted from an existing County policy attributable to a municipal policymaker. The court concluded that his allegations amounted to an impermissible attempt to hold the County responsible simply for the deputies’ alleged conduct. The court therefore granted the motion to dismiss on the custom, policy, or practice theory.
The court also rejected the failure-to-train theory. Prescott did not allege what training the deputies received, what training they should have received, or how inadequate training caused the alleged constitutional violations. The court therefore granted the motion as to the failure-to-train theory.
The court concluded that Prescott had already had an opportunity to amend and had not identified additional facts he could add. It found that another opportunity to amend would be futile.
Doe defendants and case status
The defendants also asked the court to address the unidentified and unserved Doe defendants. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) generally requires service of the summons and complaint within 90 days after filing. The court stated that Prescott had not identified or served the Doe defendants nearly a year after filing the case and had not shown what steps he had taken to identify them.
The court did not immediately state that the Doe defendants were dismissed. Instead, it held that Prescott must identify and serve them for the case to proceed and stated that they would be dismissed without prejudice if he did not do so.
In the conclusion, the court granted the motion to dismiss. It stated that judgment would be entered as to Contra Costa County and the Contra Costa County Sherriff’s Office, but then granted the parties’ stipulation to stay the case. The stay covered the remaining proceedings, including entry of judgment and the obligation to serve the Doe defendants, through March 14, 2025. The court directed a status report by March 11, 2025, and administratively closed the case during the stay.
Read the full 9-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.