Iliya v. United States Marshalls Service

Background

Dauda Iliya alleged that, on March 17, 2023, he went to the Ronald V. Dellums Federal Courthouse in Oakland, California, intending to file documents with the Clerk of Court. He alleged that a court security officer required him to remove a religious cap before entering. Iliya said the cap was required by a sincerely held religious belief and that he removed it under pressure so he could enter and file his documents.

Iliya submitted an administrative claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act to the United States Marshals Service on or around March 20, 2023. He alleged that the agency denied that claim on December 19, 2023. He filed this lawsuit on June 20, 2024, naming the United States Marshals Service and unidentified defendants. His complaint sought $3,120,210 and an order prohibiting enforcement of policies that unlawfully restricted his religious practices.

The complaint asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the First and Fifth Amendments, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 41 C.F.R. § 102-74.445, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and Title VII. The United States Marshals Service moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) and failure to state a legally sufficient claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

Court’s reasoning

Section 1983. The court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot provide a claim against the United States Marshals Service because it applies to conduct under state law and does not waive the federal government’s immunity from suit. The court granted dismissal of Iliya’s § 1983 claims without leave to amend. The court also noted that Iliya could not add a claim under Bivens through his opposition brief and that a damages claim under Bivens could not be brought against a federal agency.

First and Fifth Amendments. The court held that the federal government’s immunity barred claims for money damages against the agency based on alleged First and Fifth Amendment violations. As to requested equitable relief, meaning nonmonetary relief such as an injunction, the court held that Iliya had not shown standing. He alleged only a past incident, not a real and immediate threat that the same injury would happen again. He did not allege that the United States Marshals Service had a pattern or practice of requiring visitors to remove headgear, that he planned to return to the courthouse, or that he was deterred from returning. The court granted dismissal without leave to amend as to monetary damages and with leave to amend as to equitable relief, but only if Iliya could allege an immediate threat of repeated injury and an intent to return or deterrence from returning.

Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The court held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act did not waive the federal government’s immunity from damages. For equitable relief, the court again found that Iliya had not alleged facts establishing standing because he did not allege a likely repeated injury, a pattern or practice by the agency, an intent to return to the courthouse, or deterrence from returning. The court granted dismissal without leave to amend as to damages and with leave to amend as to equitable relief under the same conditions stated for the constitutional claims.

Tort claims. The court held that the Federal Tort Claims Act is the exclusive remedy for tort claims against a federal agency, but that an action under that statute must be brought against the United States rather than the agency. Because Iliya named only the United States Marshals Service, the court dismissed his negligence and intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims. The court also held that, even if the claims were treated as Federal Tort Claims Act claims against the United States, they were filed six months and one day after the alleged denial of his administrative claim and were therefore untimely. The court rejected Iliya’s arguments based on the federal counting rule and equitable tolling. It granted dismissal without leave to amend as to tort claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act.

Title VII. The court dismissed Iliya’s Title VII claim because he did not allege an employment relationship with the United States Marshals Service. The court granted dismissal without leave to amend.

41 C.F.R. § 102-74.445. The court held that the regulation, which addresses discrimination in providing or refusing access to public federal facilities, did not itself create a private right to sue. The court granted dismissal of this claim without leave to amend.

Requests to add claims. Iliya asked to add claims under Title VI, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and California’s Bane Act. The court denied leave to add the Title VI and Americans with Disabilities Act claims against the United States Marshals Service, finding amendment would be futile. It also denied leave to add Bane Act claims against the United States Marshals Service or the United States based on alleged constitutional violations, because the court held that the Federal Tort Claims Act did not waive immunity for those claims.

Disposition

Judge Thomas S. Hixson granted the United States Marshals Service’s motion to dismiss. The order dismissed without leave to amend the § 1983 claims; damages claims under the First and Fifth Amendments and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act; the tort claims, including any Federal Tort Claims Act claims; the Title VII claim; and the claim under 41 C.F.R. § 102-74.445. It dismissed the First and Fifth Amendment and Religious Freedom Restoration Act claims for equitable relief with leave to amend under specified conditions. The court denied leave to add claims under Title VI, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Bane Act. Iliya could file a first amended complaint by January 21, 2025, and the order stated that failing to do so could result in dismissal of the case.