BOSTICK v. AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY

Background

Claudia J. Bostick represented herself and proceeded without paying filing fees. She sued American Express Company and Bank of New York Mellon Corporation. The amended complaint alleged that American Express issued an unfavorable decision on her request for credit, and that entities associated with American Express securitized an alleged payment intangible. Bostick also alleged that Bank of New York Mellon, acting as a securities intermediary and trustee, failed to carry out an order concerning her claimed securities entitlement.

Bostick asserted claims under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, and Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. She also invoked a provision of the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted by Georgia and sought damages and several orders concerning credit cards, securities ownership, cash flows, and a security identifier.

Court’s Analysis

Because Bostick was proceeding without paying filing fees, the court was required to dismiss claims that were frivolous, failed to state a claim, sought relief from an immune defendant, or fell outside the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. The court also explained that, although self-represented pleadings are read liberally, they must still provide a short and plain statement of facts showing a plausible right to relief.

The court held that the amended complaint did not comply with that requirement. It said the complaint was filled with financial terminology and conclusory statements that obscured the facts and legal claims.

As to the credit-denial allegations, the court found that Bostick did not explain why American Express denied credit or allege that the decision violated a federal right. Although the Equal Credit Opportunity Act prohibits discrimination in credit decisions based on listed characteristics, Bostick did not allege that the decision was based on any of them. The court therefore dismissed any federal claims arising from the denial of credit for failure to state a claim.

The court also dismissed the securities claims for failure to state a claim. For the Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 allegations, Bostick did not allege facts showing, among other things, that she purchased or sold a security, that the defendants made a material misrepresentation, or that they acted with wrongful intent. For the Section 11 claim, she did not allege that she was an investor in a security or that a registration statement contained a material misrepresentation or omission.

For the possible state-law claims, the court found that the complaint did not adequately establish diversity jurisdiction. Bostick identified herself as a Georgia resident and stated that American Express was a New York resident, but she did not allege the required incorporation or principal-place-of-business information for the defendants. The court also noted uncertainty about whether the claims exceeded the $75,000 jurisdictional amount. Because it dismissed the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims.

Disposition

The court dismissed the amended complaint for failure to state a claim, with 30 days’ leave to replead. Bostick may file a second amended complaint stating a viable federal claim or, if pursuing only state-law claims, alleging facts establishing diversity jurisdiction. The opinion did not state that the dismissal was with or without prejudice. If Bostick does not file a second amended complaint within the allowed time, the court said it will direct the Clerk of Court to enter judgment.

Judge Laura Taylor Swain directed the Clerk to keep the matter open until a civil judgment is entered. She also certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-free status for purposes of an appeal.