Brown v. RXR Soyo Exalta, LLC

Background

Marla McKeida Brown appeared without a lawyer and filed an amended complaint against Jennifer L. Alexander, Alison Lenihan, RXR Soyo Exalta, LLC, and the State of New York. She asserted claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and state law. She sought damages and injunctive relief.

The court understood Brown to allege that, as beneficiary and executrix of the “Marla Brown Estate Trust,” she entered a trust deed agreement with RXR concerning property at 45 Main St. in Yonkers, New York. She alleged that RXR failed to disclose matters related to the agreement, breached trust and fiduciary duties, failed to provide an accounting, and did not respond to her notices. The court stated that the amended complaint was difficult to understand and described these allegations as what Brown “seems to allege.”

Claims Brown Could Not Bring for Others

The court dismissed without prejudice claims Brown asserted for other people, including family members, a trust, and a deceased person’s estate in which she appeared to be one of multiple beneficiaries. The court explained that a nonlawyer may represent herself but generally may not represent another person or an artificial entity, such as a trust, in federal court. It also explained that a nonlawyer beneficiary generally may not represent an estate when other beneficiaries may be affected.

Federal Criminal Statutes

To the extent Brown sought to have the defendants criminally prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, the court dismissed those claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court explained that only prosecutors may decide whether to bring a criminal case; neither Brown nor the court could require prosecutors to do so. The opinion does not state a separate prejudice designation for this dismissal.

Claims Against the State of New York

The court dismissed Brown’s claims under § 1983 and RICO against the State of New York. It held that the Eleventh Amendment generally protects states from federal-court suits unless the state waives its immunity or Congress removes it. The court found that Congress had not removed New York’s immunity for these claims and that New York had not waived it. The court therefore dismissed these claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and because they sought monetary relief from an immune defendant.

Section 1983 Claims Against the Other Defendants

The court dismissed Brown’s § 1983 claims against Alexander, Lenihan, and RXR for failure to state a claim. A § 1983 claim requires a violation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law, meaning through authority or conduct attributable to the government. The court concluded that Alexander, RXR, and Lenihan, whom Brown alleged was an attorney, appeared to be private parties, and Brown alleged no facts showing that they acted as state actors. The court therefore found the § 1983 claims legally insufficient.

RICO Claims Against the Other Defendants

The court dismissed Brown’s civil RICO claims against Alexander, Lenihan, and RXR for failure to state a claim. Although the court discussed the requirements for a civil RICO claim and a RICO conspiracy claim, it found that Brown alleged no facts satisfying either type of claim. The court characterized the allegations as arising from a dispute with RXR about real estate in Yonkers, New York. The court also noted that Brown had not alleged facts showing that Alexander and Lenihan were found, had an agent, or transacted business in the district, although it stated that the district appeared to be a proper venue for claims against RXR.

State-Law Claims and Leave to Amend

The court construed the amended complaint as asserting state-law claims under the court’s supplemental jurisdiction, which allows a federal court to hear related state-law claims in some circumstances. After dismissing all claims within its original federal jurisdiction, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.

The court denied leave to file a second amended complaint. Although courts generally give a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to correct pleading problems, the court concluded that the defects in Brown’s amended complaint could not be cured by another amendment.

Disposition

The court dismissed the action and directed the Clerk of Court to enter judgment. It certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied permission to proceed without paying fees for an appeal.