DiDonna v. Mass

Background

Louis A. DiDonna, proceeding without a lawyer and without paying the filing fee, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 concerning his March 15, 2021 arrest. He alleged that the defendants used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment by putting him against a sheriff’s vehicle and applying overly tight handcuffs. He also alleged that the defendants failed to intervene to stop the excessive force.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, which is a request for judgment without a trial because the evidence supposedly leaves no genuine dispute requiring a jury’s decision. DiDonna did not file an opposition, despite receiving the motion papers, warnings about the consequences of failing to respond, and several extensions of time. The court therefore treated the motions as unopposed, but it still independently considered whether the defendants were entitled to judgment under the law and whether the factual assertions were supported by evidence.

The court noted evidence that DiDonna did not stop after a sheriff’s vehicle activated its emergency lights, that officers pursued him, and that his driving led to collisions with several law-enforcement vehicles. After his vehicle stopped, DiDonna was removed, placed against the vehicle, handcuffed, patted down, and transported to the sheriff’s department. He testified that he was slammed against the vehicle, injuring his right rib, and that the handcuffs injured his right wrist. The medical records included X-rays showing no rib fracture and testing showing mild median neuropathy at the wrist, as well as records of a prior right-hand injury.

Personal involvement

A defendant can be liable under Section 1983 only for that defendant’s own actions or participation in the alleged constitutional violation. The court found that the evidence did not show that Conner Stewart or Douglas Ketchum participated in, or were present for, the alleged uses of force. Stewart was involved in the pursuit but testified that he did not remove or handcuff DiDonna and did not see the alleged force. Ketchum was involved in the pursuit and a vehicle collision, but the evidence showed that DiDonna had already been removed, handcuffed, and patted down before Ketchum arrived at that part of the scene. The court therefore granted summary judgment as to Stewart and Ketchum on lack of personal involvement and dismissed the two claims asserted against them.

The court reached a different conclusion as to Robert Maas, Kyle Farrand, and Anthony Skow at the personal-involvement stage. The evidence showed that they were present during the arrest and that they were at least potentially involved in placing DiDonna against the vehicle or handcuffing him. The court therefore did not grant summary judgment to those defendants on the ground that they lacked personal involvement.

Excessive force and failure to intervene

The court nevertheless granted summary judgment to all defendants on the claims themselves. For the claim concerning the force used to put DiDonna against the vehicle, the court applied the Fourth Amendment’s objective-reasonableness test. It considered the circumstances confronting the officers, including DiDonna’s failure to stop, the pursuit and collisions, the report that he might be impaired, and his failure to follow the order to exit the vehicle. The court held that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that putting him against the vehicle so he could be handcuffed and searched was objectively unreasonable.

The court also held that DiDonna’s alleged rib injury could not support the claim because the medical records contradicted his description of a broken or shattered rib. X-rays taken fifteen days after the arrest and about a year later showed no right-rib fracture. The court concluded that his unsupported testimony did not create a genuine dispute of material fact.

For the handcuffing claim, the court considered whether the handcuffs were unreasonably tight, whether the defendants ignored DiDonna’s complaints, and the extent of his wrist injury. The evidence showed that DiDonna complained about the handcuffs and that Skow adjusted them. But the court found that the claimed permanent hand injury was unsupported by admissible evidence. DiDonna did not complain about right-hand pain to emergency medical personnel on the day of the arrest, later testing did not establish the claimed permanent nerve damage, and the records showed a prior right-hand injury. The court held that any supported injury was too minor to constitute excessive force under the applicable standard.

Because the court found no excessive-force violation, it also rejected the failure-to-intervene claim. An officer’s duty to intervene arises only when another officer is violating a person’s constitutional rights.

Disposition

Judge Philip M. Halpern granted the defendants’ unopposed motions for summary judgment. The court dismissed the claims against Stewart and Ketchum for lack of personal involvement and granted summary judgment to all defendants on DiDonna’s excessive-force and failure-to-intervene claims. The court did not reach the defendants’ qualified-immunity arguments. The Clerk was directed to terminate the pending motions, mail the opinion and order to DiDonna, and close the case.