Chand v. Regan

Background

Sharon S. Chand sued Michael S. Regan, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, her former employer. Chand proceeded without a lawyer. She alleged five forms of disability-related employment wrongdoing under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act: disparate treatment, retaliation, hostile work environment, failure to accommodate, and interference with rights protected by the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Chand worked in the EPA’s Office of Civil Rights from September 2013 to September 2015 under a hiring authority for people with physical disabilities. She had several medical conditions, including deep vein thrombosis, inflammation, and major depressive disorder. The EPA approved a flexible start-time accommodation allowing her to begin work up to one hour after her standard start time, with an adjusted end time. The agency also required her to notify the office about late arrivals and, in some circumstances, to call her supervisors and take leave.

Chand alleged that supervisor Gina Edwards denied or restricted additional accommodations, including changes to her work hours, a chair at a World AIDS Day event, and telework. She also alleged that Edwards created a hostile work environment. After Chand reported alleged violations to EPA human-resources staff and filed a formal complaint against Edwards, the EPA investigated, reassigned Chand to supervisor Carolyn Truong, and moved Chand to another floor. Chand later took leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act. She was terminated on September 18, 2015, after the end of her two-year probationary period.

Summary-judgment standard

Summary judgment is a ruling before trial that is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over facts that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court must view the evidence and reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion, but the opposing party must present enough evidence for a reasonable factfinder to rule in her favor.

Disability discrimination

The court granted summary judgment on Chand’s disparate-treatment claim concerning her termination. The parties agreed that Chand had a disability and was qualified for the job, and the court found that she established an initial case of discrimination. The burden therefore shifted to the defendant to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination.

The defendant stated that Chand was terminated because of performance problems, not because of her disability. The court found performance to be a legitimate reason for ending her employment after the probationary period. It rejected Chand’s argument that the stated performance concerns were based on her use of the flexible start-time accommodation. The court found that the cited concerns involved taking on multiple projects and higher-level responsibilities, completing assignments independently, and producing accurate and timely work.

The court then considered whether Chand had shown that this explanation was a pretext, meaning an untrue reason masking disability discrimination. It found that she had not presented direct or sufficiently strong circumstantial evidence of discriminatory bias. The court also found that a “Fully Successful” performance rating did not automatically entitle Chand to conversion to a permanent position because the Schedule A hiring authority gave the agency discretion not to convert her. Disputes about internal documents, a performance review, and Edwards’s views did not create a material factual dispute, particularly because Strauss was the final decision-maker and had independent knowledge of Chand’s performance issues.

Retaliation

The court granted summary judgment on Chand’s entire retaliation claim. Chand identified several alleged retaliatory actions: her reassignment to a new supervisor and desk, Edwards’s continued presence near her new work area, delays in the investigation and a telework request, and her termination after requesting an extension of leave.

As to the February 2015 complaint, the court found that Chand had not shown a materially adverse action. The move placed her closer to her temporary supervisor and was intended to improve her work environment. The court found that Edwards’s presence, alleged laughter, the investigation’s timing, and the alleged telework delay did not, on the record presented, show conduct likely to discourage a reasonable employee from reporting discrimination. The court also noted that Chand had not shown that she made a formal telework request.

As to the September 2015 leave request, the court agreed that termination was an adverse employment action but found insufficient evidence that retaliation was the required but-for cause. The leave request was approved by Truong, while Strauss made the termination decision. The timing of the request was not enough by itself to establish that Chand would not have been terminated without the request. The court further held that, even if Chand could establish causation, she had not shown that the defendant’s performance-based explanation was pretextual.

Failure to accommodate

The court granted the motion as to the October 27, 2014 incident and denied it as to the other three accommodation requests. Chand alleged that Edwards directed her to report at 7:45 a.m. despite her 8:30 a.m. start-time accommodation. The court found that Chand had not actually requested an accommodation on that date and that the existing accommodation did not cover special events she was required to attend.

The court found factual disputes concerning the October 30 request to start earlier, find disabled parking, or telework. It concluded that Chand’s transportation needs were plausibly related to her disability and that the EPA’s existing flexible start-time accommodation did not eliminate its duty to discuss additional accommodations when Chand explained that the existing arrangement would not work that day.

The court also found a factual dispute regarding Chand’s request for a chair at the December 1, 2014 event. A reasonable factfinder could conclude that her presence at the event was an essential job function, and Chand had explained her need for the chair before the request was denied.

Finally, the court found that Chand had communicated a need for telework well enough to establish an initial accommodation claim, even though she may not have followed the agency’s formal telework procedures. Viewing the evidence in Chand’s favor, a factfinder could determine that the defendant failed to engage in the interactive process by not considering telework as a possible reasonable accommodation.

Hostile work environment

The court denied summary judgment on Chand’s hostile-work-environment claim. It applied the standard requiring evidence that the alleged harassment was related to disability, unwelcome, and sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment.

The court found a genuine factual dispute about whether Edwards’s conduct was related to Chand’s disability. Chand presented evidence that Edwards repeatedly described arrivals within the approved flexible start window as “tardiness,” characterized her transportation needs as personal preference, and imposed changing reporting procedures on her use of the accommodation. The court found that a reasonable factfinder could connect this conduct to Chand’s disability and accommodation.

The court also found a factual dispute about whether the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive. Although no single incident was obviously serious, Chand described frequent harsh, punitive, and intimidating communications over more than a year, supported by emails and other witness evidence. The court held that this close question was better left to a factfinder. It also found that, even assuming the defendant needed to show it took adequate corrective action, a factfinder could conclude that the EPA did not sufficiently remedy the alleged harassment because Edwards remained near Chand after the reassignment.

ADA interference

The court granted summary judgment on Chand’s ADA-interference claim. Although Chand had referenced facts that might relate to interference, she presented no evidence opposing the defendant’s motion on this claim. The court therefore found no genuine dispute of material fact.

Disposition

The court granted the motion for summary judgment as to Chand’s disability-discrimination, retaliation, and ADA-interference claims. It also granted the motion as to the October 27, 2014 accommodation incident. It denied the motion as to the accommodation claims concerning the October 30 adjusted-start request, the chair at the December 1 event, and telework. It also denied the motion as to the hostile-work-environment claim. The court set a status conference for January 23, 2025, and ordered the parties to submit a status report by January 16, 2025.