Evans v. Bronxworks, Inc.
- Lewis Liman
- 1:24-cv-07507
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 4
In Evans v. Bronxworks, Judge Liman denied Evans’s motion to remand because her federal-statute claims were removable.
Ebiranna Evans’s case remains in federal court rather than being returned to New York state court; the order did not decide the merits of her underlying claims against Bronxworks, Inc.
What happened
In Evans v. Bronxworks, Inc., Ebiranna Evans sued Bronxworks in New York state court, alleging that it delayed or denied emergency assistance related to domestic violence. She asserted breach-of-contract, discrimination, retaliation, and federal statutory claims.
Bronxworks moved the case to federal court because the complaint cited federal statutes. Evans asked the federal court to send the case back, arguing that state and federal courts shared authority over some claims and that federal law made the case impossible to move. She also argued that her allegations should be treated as a claim under a federal Violence Against Women Act provision.
The court denied Evans’s motion to remand, concluding that the federal statutes cited in her complaint gave the federal court authority to hear the case and that shared state and federal authority did not prevent removal. Judge Liman also concluded that the Violence Against Women Act provision Evans invoked did not apply to her allegations and had been held unconstitutional.
The detailed version
- Evans v. Bronxworks, Inc. · No. 1:24-cv-07507
- Lewis Liman
- Jan. 3, 2025
Background
Ebiranna Evans, who was proceeding without a lawyer, filed a complaint against Bronxworks, Inc. in New York Supreme Court, Bronx County. She alleged that she sought emergency assistance related to domestic violence and that Bronxworks repeatedly turned her away or delayed assistance despite knowing that her situation was urgent. Her complaint asserted claims for breach of contract, discrimination, and retaliation, and cited several federal statutes, including provisions in Title 34 of the United States Code.
Bronxworks removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Removal is the process by which a defendant transfers a case from state court to federal court. Bronxworks stated that removal was proper because Evans’s complaint raised claims under federal statutes, giving the federal court original jurisdiction, meaning authority to hear the case at the outset.
Motion to Remand
Evans asked the court to remand, or return, the case to state court. She argued that state courts had concurrent jurisdiction over actions under 34 U.S.C. § 12361 and that the case therefore belonged in state court. She also argued that 28 U.S.C. § 1445(d) made the case nonremovable because that provision bars removal of certain civil actions arising under section 40302 of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994.
The court rejected the concurrent-jurisdiction argument. It explained that the federal statutes cited in Evans’s complaint were federal laws and that federal courts therefore had jurisdiction. The fact that state courts might also have jurisdiction did not prevent Bronxworks from removing the case.
The court also concluded that Evans’s allegations did not state a claim under 34 U.S.C. § 12361(c), the provision she relied on for the nonremovability argument. That provision concerns a person who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender. The court found that Evans alleged that Bronxworks ignored her concerns and significantly delayed her ability to find new housing, not that Bronxworks committed a crime of violence against her. The court further stated that the Supreme Court had held § 12361(c) unconstitutional in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). It therefore concluded that § 1445(d) did not provide a basis for remand.
Ruling and Effect
The court held that Bronxworks properly removed the case because Evans’s complaint cited federal statutes. It denied Evans’s motion to remand and directed the Clerk of Court to close the motion docket entry. The order addressed the location of the case, not whether Evans would ultimately prevail on her underlying claims.
The opinion notes that the copy of the complaint appeared to cite “U.S.C. 1249,” a statute that does not exist. The court understood that citation, based on context, to refer to 34 U.S.C. § 12491, while stating that Evans could clarify the citation in a future filing.
Read the full 4-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.