Dixon v. City of New York

Background

Keena Dixon sued the City of New York and Deputy Wardens Tisha Wilkins, Wanda Jones, and Tamika White, and Captains Jainai Kranwinkle and Maria Camacho, in their individual and official capacities. She alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law.

Dixon alleged that three fingers were crushed in a workplace accident in July 2020. A Department of Correction doctor placed her on MMR3 restricted status, which, according to the amended complaint, limited her duties by barring inmate supervision, heavy pushing, pulling, and lifting, overtime, and operation of a department vehicle. Dixon alleged that the defendants nevertheless repeatedly assigned her to a control-room post involving inmate contact and heavy laundry bags. She also alleged that she injured herself while opening a broken control-room door, that inmates threatened her there, that officials failed to investigate the threats, and that officials later ordered her to work overtime despite her restrictions.

Dixon further alleged that she requested reassignment and complained about the failure to follow her restrictions. She claimed that officials refused to accept her attempted resignation in July 2022 and that she ultimately resigned on August 1, 2022. The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim based on its allegations.

Federal Disability Claims

The court treated the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims under the same standards. It held that Dixon plausibly alleged that she had a disability because she described physical impairments that substantially limited her ability to work. The court also found that the alleged MMR3 restrictions, notice to the defendants, request for reassignment, and existence of other posts that allegedly would have complied with the restrictions plausibly supported a failure-to-accommodate claim.

The court therefore denied the motion to dismiss Dixon’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act discrimination claims based on failure to provide reasonable accommodations.

The court rejected Dixon’s discrimination theory based on an adverse employment action. It held that the alleged verbal abuse, inmate threats, repeated control-room assignments, and claimed constructive discharge did not plausibly show an adverse employment action taken because of her disability. The court also held that Dixon had not plausibly alleged constructive discharge, which requires working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign.

The court granted the motion to dismiss Dixon’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act retaliation claims. Although her complaints about the failure to accommodate were protected activity, the court found that she had not plausibly alleged that the complaints caused the overtime orders, control-room assignments, or refusal to accept her resignation. The court also granted the motion to dismiss the federal hostile-work-environment claims, finding that the alleged conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive.

New York State and City Claims

The court applied the more liberal standard it described for the amended New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law. It held that Dixon had not plausibly alleged that she was treated less well, or received inferior employment conditions, because of her disability. The court therefore rejected her state and city discrimination claims apart from the failure-to-accommodate theory.

Because Dixon plausibly stated a failure-to-accommodate claim under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, the court held that she also stated failure-to-accommodate claims under the New York State and New York City laws. The court denied the motion to dismiss those claims.

The court granted the motion to dismiss Dixon’s state and city retaliation claims because she did not allege facts supporting a causal connection between her complaints and the treatment she received or the circumstances of her resignation. It also granted the motion to dismiss her state and city hostile-work-environment claims because she did not allege that she received worse treatment than nondisabled correction officers because of her disability.

Disposition

Judge Koeltl granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The failure-to-accommodate claims under the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, New York State Human Rights Law, and New York City Human Rights Law survived. The adverse-employment-action discrimination theory, retaliation claims, hostile-work-environment claims, and constructive-discharge claim were dismissed to the extent described in the opinion. The order did not state that the dismissal was with or without prejudice.