Lions v. New York State Office of Child Support Enforcement

Background

Gregory Lions filed the action pro se and challenged child-support enforcement connected to a 2002 Staten Island paternity proceeding. He alleged that, since at least 2017, the New York Office of Child Support Enforcement had garnished his wages and intercepted his federal tax refunds. He also alleged that $3,500 from a September 2023 bail settlement was taken for child-support arrears, that his right to receive a passport was withheld, and that he was not notified that he had become responsible for an arrears contract or provided the applicable interest terms.

Lions sought an order stopping collection efforts and the return of $12,805.10 that he said had been taken from his wages, settlements, and other income. His complaint expressly invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of due process and the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. The court also read the pro se complaint to raise claims concerning enforcement of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act and the New York Constitution.

Claims Against the State Agency

The court dismissed the claims against the New York State Division of Child Support Enforcement because it is a state agency and therefore protected by the Eleventh Amendment. The court stated that New York had not waived that immunity and that Congress had not removed it for claims under Section 1983. The court also concluded that the exception for suits challenging unconstitutional actions by state officials did not apply because the complaint could not be read as challenging such an official action.

Claims Against the City and the State-Court Order

The court held that the New York City Office of Child Support Enforcement was not a suable entity under the New York City Charter. Because Lions was proceeding without a lawyer, the court substituted the City of New York as the proper defendant while dismissing the claims against the agency itself.

The court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred review of claims that effectively challenged the state family court’s child-support order. That doctrine prevents a federal district court from acting as an appeals court over a state-court judgment. The court concluded that Lions’s challenges to the garnishments, alleged excessive fines, and due-process violations sought review or rejection of the underlying state-court judgment.

The court separately held that it had to abstain from considering claims seeking to modify the amount of Lions’s child-support obligations. Abstention means declining to decide an issue because state courts are the proper forum; the court treated child-support modification as a domestic-relations matter.

Section 1983 and Title IV-D Claims

The court held that any remaining Section 1983 claims against the City were inadequately pleaded. A municipality generally can be liable under Section 1983 only when a municipal policy, custom, or official decision caused the alleged violation. The court found that Lions had not alleged a City policy causing the harm, a meaningful municipal choice to enforce state law in the challenged way, or an official policy of withholding notice. The court dismissed those claims but granted leave to replead them.

The court also held that Title IV-D’s requirement that states operate child-support programs in substantial compliance with federal guidelines did not create a private right of action that Lions could enforce through Section 1983. The court therefore dismissed any claim seeking to require New York to comply with that requirement.

State-Law Claims and Disposition

After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining claims under the New York Constitution. The court also stated that it lacked diversity jurisdiction over those claims because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the domestic-relations exception barred federal review of the child-support proceeding.

The court dismissed Lions’s claims without prejudice and granted him 30 days from the order to file an amended complaint. If he did not amend within that period, the court stated that the Clerk would be directed to enter judgment dismissing the action. Judge Gregory H. Woods signed the order on January 10, 2025.