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N.D. Cal.Procedural orderFiled Jan. 14, 2025

Henry v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Judge
Vince Chhabria
Docket
3:24-cv-04489
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
2
Civil ProcedureMotion to Dismiss
In one sentence

In Henry v. Chase, Judge Chhabria denied Henry’s motion to dismiss Chase’s debt counterclaims for lack of supplemental jurisdiction.

Who this affects

Gina Henry and J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.; Chase’s counterclaims seeking recovery of the alleged credit card debt remain in the federal case.

What happened

In Henry v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., Gina Henry sued Chase, alleging that it violated federal and state law by repeatedly calling her about credit card debt with a prerecorded or artificial voice without her consent.

Chase responded with counterclaims seeking to recover the debt it says Henry owes. Henry asked the court to dismiss those counterclaims, arguing that they did not arise from the same facts as her claims.

Judge Vince Chhabria denied the motion. He ruled that the claims and counterclaims arose from the same core set of facts and that there were no compelling reasons to decline the court’s authority to hear the counterclaims.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Henry v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. · No. 3:24-cv-04489
Judge
Vince Chhabria
Date
Jan. 14, 2025

Background

After Gina Henry fell behind on credit card payments, J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. began calling her to collect the debt. Henry sued Chase, alleging violations of federal and state law based on repeated calls using a prerecorded or artificial voice without her consent. Chase filed counterclaims seeking to recover the debt it alleges Henry owes.

Motion and analysis

Henry moved to dismiss Chase’s counterclaims under the argument that the court lacked supplemental jurisdiction. Supplemental jurisdiction allows a federal court to hear additional claims that are sufficiently related to claims already before it. Henry argued that Chase’s counterclaims did not arise from the same nucleus of operative facts as her claims.

The court rejected that argument. It acknowledged that the counterclaims might not require proof of the same facts or arise from the same transaction or occurrence as Henry’s claims. But the court concluded that the counterclaims clearly arose from the same nucleus of operative facts and therefore formed part of the same case or controversy under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

The court also found no compelling reason to decline supplemental jurisdiction. Henry argued that allowing debt-collection counterclaims of this kind could discourage people from asserting rights under laws such as the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The court reasoned that dismissing the counterclaims would leave Chase free to bring them in a separate state-court action, which could impose greater expense and burden on Henry by requiring her to litigate two separate cases.

Disposition

Judge Vince Chhabria denied Henry’s motion to dismiss Chase’s counterclaims.

The authoritative version

Read the full 2-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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