UnifySCC v. Cody

Background

Santa Clara County adopted a policy in August 2021 requiring County personnel to be vaccinated against COVID-19, subject to medical, disability, and religious exemptions. For employees who received exemptions, the County classified their positions as low-, intermediate-, or high-risk. Exempt employees in low- and intermediate-risk positions could continue working with specified masking and testing requirements. Exempt employees in high-risk positions were placed on temporary leave while they sought reassignment or transfer.

The plaintiffs and class members alleged that they held sincere religious beliefs preventing them from receiving COVID-19 vaccinations or boosters. The named plaintiffs included registered nurses Maria Ramirez and Elizabeth Baluyut and Tom Davis, who worked in the County’s Fleet and Facilities Department. Each received a religious exemption and held a position classified as high-risk. The County later rescinded its vaccination requirement on September 27, 2022.

The amended complaint asserted claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, the First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including a claim that the County was municipally liable for a civil-rights violation.

Motions and legal standard

Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on the Title VII, Fair Employment and Housing Act, municipal-liability, and Free Exercise claims. Defendants cross-moved for summary judgment on all claims. Summary judgment may be granted only when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law.

Title VII and Fair Employment and Housing Act claims

The court held that undisputed facts established the first parts of the plaintiffs’ failure-to-accommodate claims: the County required vaccination, the plaintiffs asserted sincere religious beliefs conflicting with that requirement, and they informed the County of the conflict.

The court declined to decide the adverse-employment-action issue for the entire class. It found evidence that some named plaintiffs were placed on involuntary, extended unpaid leave, which could qualify as an adverse employment action. But the record also showed that hundreds of class members took paid leave, 238 did not go on leave, and some chose vaccination instead of leave. These differences created factual disputes about whether the County took an adverse employment action against all class members.

The court also found factual disputes about whether the County made good-faith efforts to accommodate religious practices and whether the requested accommodations would have caused an undue hardship. The evidence included the County’s efforts to identify transfers and reassignments, as well as evidence that some employees may have received little more than instructions to apply for other jobs. Evidence about vaccination, masking, testing, transmission risks, staffing concerns, and the County’s later policy changes also created a factual dispute about undue hardship.

The court therefore denied both plaintiffs’ and defendants’ motions for summary judgment as to the Title VII and Fair Employment and Housing Act claims.

Free Exercise and Equal Protection claims

The court analyzed the County’s Risk Tier System separately from the accommodations procedure. It held that the Risk Tier System was religiously neutral and generally applicable because it used objective, job-related criteria and there was no evidence that religion influenced the classifications. The court further held that the system survived rational-basis review because tailoring accommodations to the COVID-19 transmission risk associated with particular jobs was rationally related to preventing the spread of COVID-19.

Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted as to the Free Exercise and Equal Protection claims insofar as they were based on the Risk Tier System. Plaintiffs’ partial motion was denied to that extent.

The court reached a different conclusion about the County’s accommodations procedure. The County had indicated that employees with disability-based exemptions might receive priority consideration for transfers over employees with religious exemptions. The court held that this policy was not religiously neutral and generally applicable because the employees were similarly situated for purposes of the County’s stated health interest, and the type of exemption did not change the employee’s transmission risk or suitability for a lower-risk position. Applying strict scrutiny, the court held that the preference was not narrowly tailored to the compelling interest of limiting COVID-19 transmission.

Even so, the court denied summary judgment to both sides on the accommodations-procedure portion of the Free Exercise and Equal Protection claims. The court found that many class members could not show injury because they never applied for lower-risk jobs, and the plaintiffs had not provided enough evidence to determine whether the named plaintiffs themselves were denied an opportunity because of the preference. Defendants also had not negated an essential element of those claims or shown that plaintiffs lacked enough evidence to prove them at trial.

Municipal-liability claim

The court denied plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on the County’s municipal liability under the rule commonly called Monell liability. The court reasoned that plaintiffs had not yet proved that the named plaintiffs or class members suffered a constitutional violation.

Establishment Clause claim

Defendants moved for summary judgment on the Establishment Clause claim, arguing that the County adopted its policies for the secular purpose of responding to the COVID-19 emergency and did not advance or disapprove of religion. Plaintiffs argued that the County showed hostility toward religion by favoring secular or disability-based objectors over religious objectors.

The court held that defendants had not met their summary-judgment burden. Evidence that class representatives had not personally experienced hostility toward their religion did not negate an essential element of the claim. The court therefore denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Establishment Clause claim.

Dismissal of individual officials

The court dismissed County Health Officer Sara Cody, former County Counsel James Williams, and former County Executive Dr. Jeffrey Smith. The court agreed with defendants that the officials, who were sued only in their official capacities, were redundant parties and were not necessary to resolve the action.

Disposition

The court denied plaintiffs’ partial motion for summary judgment. It granted in part and denied in part defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment. Specifically, both sides’ motions were denied as to the Title VII and Fair Employment and Housing Act claims; defendants’ motion was granted as to the Free Exercise and Equal Protection claims based on the Risk Tier System; both sides’ motions were denied as to the Free Exercise and Equal Protection claims based on the accommodations procedure; plaintiffs’ motion was denied as to the County’s municipal liability; defendants’ motion was denied as to the Establishment Clause claim; and Sara Cody, James Williams, and Dr. Jeffrey Smith were dismissed as redundant defendants.