Darwin v. Newburgh Operations, LLC

Background

Robin Darwin sued Newburgh Operations, LLC, doing business as Sapphire Nursing at Meadow Hill, and Tzvi Barax. She asserted disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. She alleged that Sapphire terminated her employment and related benefits because of her disability and requests for medical accommodations. She also asserted intentional infliction of emotional distress and claims that Barax aided and abetted violations of the state and city laws.

Darwin became ill in January 2021 and was later diagnosed with ovarian cancer. She informed defendants about her illness, medical leave, and anticipated surgery. On January 26, 2021—the day of her surgery—Barax sent her a letter stating that she had voluntarily resigned and ending her employment effective January 25. The letter also left her without health insurance. In March 2021, Barax sent another letter stating that the January termination date resulted from an administrative error, changing the termination date to March 3 and restoring pay and health benefits through that date. Darwin also said she requested accommodations for returning to work, but defendants did not respond to that request.

Summary-judgment ruling

Defendants moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is a decision without a trial when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over facts that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court found that the evidence showed defendants had decided by January 5, 2021—before Darwin reported her illness—to replace her with Bobby Thariath and end her employment in connection with Thariath’s anticipated March start. The court therefore granted summary judgment on all discrimination, retaliation, and failure-to-accommodate claims based on the planned early-March termination. The related aiding-and-abetting claims against Barax were also dismissed because those claims depended on an underlying violation.

The court granted summary judgment on Darwin’s entire federal retaliation claim, including the claim based on the January termination letter. It found that Darwin had not provided enough evidence of the significant harm required for a federal retaliation claim. The court also granted summary judgment on her intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim, finding that the January letter and defendants’ delayed response did not meet New York’s demanding requirement of extreme and outrageous conduct.

The court held in abeyance—meaning it postponed a final ruling on—the remaining claims based on the January 25 termination and loss of benefits through March 3. Those claims included federal, state, and city disability discrimination; failure to accommodate under all three laws; state and city retaliation; and related aiding-and-abetting claims against Barax. The court concluded that a jury could find the January letter was prompted by Darwin’s disclosure of her illness or her request for medical leave, but it questioned whether she had shown enough harm because defendants later restored her pay and benefits. The court ordered supplemental briefing on whether the January letter caused some injury to an employment term or condition under the Supreme Court’s decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis.

Evidentiary ruling and next steps

Darwin challenged the authenticity and reliability of documents concerning Thariath’s hiring. The court found the signed offer letter sufficiently authenticated and allowed defendants to use it in deciding the motion. It also denied Darwin’s request to exclude the affidavit and related exhibits based on her discovery objection.

The order states that defendants’ motion was granted in part and denied in part. Its conclusion grants summary judgment on the claims described above and holds the remaining claims in abeyance pending supplemental briefing. Darwin’s supplemental brief was due January 22, 2025, and defendants’ reply was due January 29, 2025. Judge Laura Taylor Swain directed the parties to rely only on the factual record already submitted in connection with the motion.