Almanzar v. Santander Bank, N.A.
- Subramanian
- 1:23-cv-10706
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 4
In Almanzar v. Santander Bank, Judge Subramanian declined to exclude evidence Santander disclosed late from its filings or trial.
Juan B. Almanzar and Santander Bank, N.A.; the ruling declined to exclude Santander’s loan application, adverse-action notice, and Ryan Trask’s testimony under Rule 37(c)(1).
What happened
Juan B. Almanzar asked the court in Almanzar v. Santander Bank, N.A. to prevent Santander from using a loan application, an adverse-action notice, and testimony from Ryan Trask because Santander disclosed them after the discovery deadline. Almanzar argued that the late disclosure prevented him from investigating the evidence and questioning Trask.
Santander said the evidence became relevant only after Almanzar testified that he had meant to apply for a loan but mistakenly submitted a credit-card application. Santander argued that the loan application and denial letter rebutted that explanation and that Almanzar suffered little or no prejudice.
Judge Arun Subramanian found that exclusion was not warranted. He accepted Santander’s explanation for the timing, found the evidence responsive to Almanzar’s explanation, and found no meaningful prejudice requiring a continuance. The court directed the clerk to terminate the motion.
The detailed version
- Almanzar v. Santander Bank, N.A. · No. 1:23-cv-10706
- Subramanian
- Jan. 17, 2025
Background
Juan B. Almanzar filed a letter motion seeking sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1). That rule can prevent a party from using information or a witness that was not timely disclosed under the discovery rules unless the failure was substantially justified or harmless.
Almanzar asked the court to exclude Santander’s loan application, adverse-action notice, and testimony from Ryan Trask from any motion, hearing, or trial. He argued that Santander produced the documents after the September 2, 2024 discovery deadline and first used Trask, whom Almanzar said had not been disclosed, in support of Santander’s summary-judgment motion. Almanzar argued that the late disclosure prevented him from deposing Trask, conducting additional discovery, and addressing the relationship between two alleged credit applications.
Santander’s response and the court’s analysis
Santander explained that both sides had treated the case as involving Almanzar’s credit-card application and denial. The parties had limited discovery accordingly, and Almanzar had objected to Santander’s request for information about loan applications as overly broad. Santander said the loan application became relevant only after Almanzar’s deposition, which occurred after the close of discovery at Almanzar’s request. During that deposition, Almanzar introduced the explanation that he had intended to apply for a loan but mistakenly submitted a credit-card application. Santander then produced the loan application and denial letter as evidence responding to that explanation.
The court found Santander’s explanation satisfactory. It also found that, although the evidence was not essential to Almanzar’s claims, it directly responded to what Santander called Almanzar’s “loan-confusion” theory. The court stated that Santander was entitled to defend itself on that basis.
The court also found no real prejudice requiring exclusion. It noted that Trask, Santander’s Director of Unsecured Consumer Personal Loans, submitted an affidavit authenticating the loan application and denial letter. The court reasoned that, unless Almanzar claimed Santander fabricated the documents, there appeared to be little factual dispute for Trask to address. It therefore found a continuance unnecessary, while allowing Almanzar to make another application if he had a good-faith basis for believing additional discovery was needed to authenticate the documents.
Ruling
Judge Arun Subramanian found that exclusion was not warranted and directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the motion at ECF No. 89. The opinion does not use the word “denied” in its concluding order; it states that exclusion was not warranted and orders termination of the motion.
Read the full 4-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.