Sanderlin v. City of San Jose

Background

The plaintiffs sought reconsideration of the court’s earlier order that granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, specifically concerning the plaintiffs’ claims under California Civil Code section 52.1, commonly called the Bane Act. The court had previously granted summary judgment on those claims because the plaintiffs had not provided evidence of threats, intimidation, or coercion beyond the alleged constitutional violations.

The plaintiffs argued that the court had overlooked authority recognizing a Bane Act theory based on an officer’s reckless disregard for constitutional or statutory protections. The defendants responded that the plaintiffs had not pleaded or presented that theory during summary judgment and that allowing it later would prejudice the defense.

Court’s analysis

The court proceeded under its inherent authority to revise an interlocutory order—an order that does not resolve every claim or party’s rights—before final judgment. It found that the Bane Act counts incorporated earlier allegations stating that the defendants acted with reckless disregard for the plaintiffs’ rights. The court therefore concluded that the plaintiffs had preserved the theory in their Third Amended Complaint.

The court also found that the plaintiffs had failed to effectively raise the theory in their opposition to summary judgment. Their opposition addressed the Bane Act claims in one sentence and did not identify evidence concerning the specific-intent element. The court considered whether that failure waived the argument, meaning that the plaintiffs could no longer rely on it.

The court nevertheless held that the plaintiffs were correct about the governing Bane Act standard. It explained that the required specific intent may be shown when an officer acts in reckless disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibitions or guarantees. It also held that the Bane Act does not require threats, intimidation, or coercion to be separate from the constitutional violation itself.

The court found the waiver question difficult because the plaintiffs had not clearly presented the argument during summary judgment, but evidence relating to their constitutional claims could also bear on specific intent under the Bane Act. If the court had applied the proper standard earlier, it could have inferred a factual dispute about specific intent from the factual disputes concerning the constitutional claims.

Disposition

The court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration and permitted their Bane Act claims to proceed to trial. The opinion does not state that the court entered a final judgment or specify any other change to the earlier summary-judgment order.