Febrianti v. NYC Health & Hospitals

Background

Erica Febrianti asked Magistrate Judge Stewart D. Aaron to recuse himself, meaning to withdraw from the case. The case was initially referred to Judge Aaron for settlement purposes and later referred for general pretrial matters, including scheduling, discovery, non-dispositive pretrial motions, settlement, and preparation of reports and recommendations on dispositive motions.

Judge Aaron had held an in-person settlement conference with Febrianti and defense counsel on July 2, 2024, without reaching a settlement. At a January 10, 2025 conference, the court also held an off-the-record settlement discussion. Febrianti later filed a letter objecting to discovery proceeding before Judge Aaron and requesting his recusal.

Febrianti’s letter alleged, among other things, that Judge Aaron told her that her case was “worthless” and ridiculed or belittled her testimony about her faith and religion. The opinion states that the central claim against NYC Health & Hospitals was that it discriminated against Febrianti because of her Islamic faith.

Legal standard

Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a federal judge must withdraw from a case when the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The test is objective: the question is what a reasonable, fully informed observer would conclude. A judge should not recuse solely because a party claims that the judge appears biased. If the legal standard for disqualification is not met, recusal is prohibited rather than optional.

Court’s analysis

Judge Aaron found no improper conduct in holding the January 10 off-the-record settlement conference. Settlement was one of the purposes of the referral, and the judge’s settlement procedures stated that settlement conferences are off the record and confidential. The opinion explains that this allows the parties and the court to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of their positions without influencing the ultimate factfinder, identified here as District Judge Rochon.

Judge Aaron also stated that his comments about weaknesses in Febrianti’s case were not disparaging of her Islamic faith. He wrote that he respected Islam and those who practice it. The opinion further relied on the principle that judicial remarks critical, disapproving, or even hostile toward parties or their cases ordinarily do not establish bias or partiality.

Disposition

Judge Aaron concluded that he could fairly and impartially handle the matters referred to him by District Judge Rochon. The court therefore denied Febrianti’s request for recusal. This opinion addressed only recusal and did not decide the merits of the underlying discrimination claims.