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N.D. Cal.Procedural orderFiled Jan. 28, 2025

Zamora v. Sacred Heart Community Service

Judge
Virginia Demarchi
Docket
5:24-cv-07733
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
10
Civil ProcedureEmploymentMotion to Dismiss
In one sentence

In Zamora v. Sacred Heart Community Service, Judge DeMarchi denied defendants’ preemption-based dismissal motion and remanded the employment case to state court.

Who this affects

Nina Zamora and defendants Sacred Heart Community Service, Poncho J. Guevara, and Does 1 through 50; the case was returned to Santa Clara County Superior Court.

What happened

In Zamora v. Sacred Heart Community Service, Nina Zamora sued Sacred Heart Community Service, Poncho J. Guevara, and others over alleged disability discrimination, retaliation, failure to accommodate, and California wage-and-break violations. Defendants removed the case from state court, arguing that a federal labor law made her claims depend on a collective bargaining agreement.

Defendants asked the federal court to dismiss the complaint, arguing that all of Zamora’s claims were preempted—displaced by federal law—and that she had not used the agreement’s grievance and arbitration procedures. They alternatively asked for a more definite statement. Zamora opposed the motion.

The court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss based on federal preemption, finding that resolving Zamora’s claims did not require interpreting the collective bargaining agreement. Because defendants conceded that no federal jurisdiction existed without preemption, Judge DeMarchi remanded the case to Santa Clara County Superior Court for further proceedings.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Zamora v. Sacred Heart Community Service · No. 5:24-cv-07733
Judge
Virginia Demarchi
Date
Jan. 28, 2025

Background

Nina Zamora filed the action in Santa Clara County Superior Court on August 23, 2024, against Sacred Heart Community Service, Poncho J. Guevara, and Does 1 through 50. She alleged that she was employed by Sacred Heart as an employment coordinator from November 16, 2021, until May 19, 2023.

According to the complaint, Zamora reported missing confidential files, was reprimanded and placed on a probationary evaluation, developed medical conditions, requested leave and workplace accommodations, and experienced alleged retaliation and worsening performance reviews. She also alleged violations of California requirements concerning meal and rest breaks, wage statements, compensation at termination, and unfair business practices.

The complaint asserted eleven state-law claims. The opinion describes claims 1 through 7 as discrimination, failure to engage in an interactive process, failure to provide reasonable accommodations, retaliation, failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation, whistleblower retaliation, and constructive discharge. Claims 8 through 11 concerned wage statements, meal and rest breaks, compensation upon termination, and unfair business practices.

Defendants removed the case to federal court, asserting that Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act made the claims federally preempted. They moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the claims were preempted and that Zamora had failed to use grievance and arbitration procedures in a collective bargaining agreement. They alternatively requested a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). The court granted defendants’ request for judicial notice of the collective bargaining agreement.

Section 301 Preemption

Section 301 preemption can apply when a state-law claim is based on a collective bargaining agreement or requires the court to interpret that agreement. The court applied the Ninth Circuit’s two-part test: first, whether the claim asserts a right created by state law rather than by the agreement; and second, whether resolving the claim nevertheless requires substantial interpretation of the agreement.

The court concluded that the first step did not support preemption because all of Zamora’s claims arose under California law, and defendants identified no basis for finding that the asserted rights were created by the collective bargaining agreement.

Claims 1 Through 7

The court held that the discrimination and retaliation claims depended on the employer’s conduct and motives, not on interpreting the agreement. Defendants pointed to agreement provisions concerning performance management, leave, discipline, and discharge, but did not identify provisions whose meaning had to be interpreted to resolve Zamora’s claims. References to agreement provisions were therefore insufficient to establish Section 301 preemption.

The motion to dismiss as to claims 1 through 7 was denied.

Claims 8 Through 11

Claims 8 through 11 concerned alleged failures to provide meal and rest breaks and related wage and business-practice claims. Defendants initially relied on a California-law exception concerning collective bargaining agreements, but later conceded that the exception did not apply to Zamora.

The court stated that California meal-period rights are nonnegotiable. Defendants cited an agreement provision giving the employer the right to determine lunch and break schedules, but did not argue that resolving Zamora’s claims required interpreting that provision. The court found that defendants had not established Section 301 preemption of claims 8 through 11 and denied the motion to dismiss as to those claims.

The court also noted that claims 8, 10, and 11 were derivative of the meal- and rest-break claim, meaning they could succeed only if Zamora established that she was denied legally required breaks and was entitled to related payments.

Remand and Disposition

Defendants conceded that, without Section 301 preemption, there was no basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Because the court found that Zamora’s claims were not preempted, it concluded that it lacked jurisdiction and ordered the case remanded to Santa Clara County Superior Court for all further proceedings.

The court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss based on Section 301 preemption and remanded the action to state court. The opinion does not separately state a disposition of defendants’ alternative request for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e).

The authoritative version

Read the full 10-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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