Boffa v. Banks

Background

Noreen Boffa sued David C. Banks, in his official capacity as former Chancellor of the New York City Department of Education, and the Department of Education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Boffa sued individually and as parent and guardian of A.M., who has multiple physical and mental impairments. A.M. attended the Hungerford School from the 2009–10 through 2019–20 school years and received special-education services, including special transportation.

Boffa disagreed with the Department of Education’s individualized education programs for A.M. and enrolled her at the private International Institute for the Brain, known as iBrain, beginning in the 2020–21 school year. Boffa then filed administrative complaints seeking tuition reimbursement and alleging that the Department had failed to provide A.M. with a free appropriate public education, or FAPE. The complaints covered the 2020–21, 2021–22, and 2022–23 school years.

An impartial hearing officer found that the Department had denied A.M. a FAPE in several ways, including by failing to evaluate or address her vision-related needs. The hearing officer awarded tuition and transportation reimbursement for the 2020–21 and 2021–22 school years and extended A.M.’s eligibility for special-education services through age 25. A state review officer affirmed the reimbursement award but reversed the extended-eligibility award. Boffa brought this federal action challenging that reversal and seeking a ruling that iBrain was A.M.’s temporary educational placement for the 2022–23 school year, along with attorneys’ fees.

Statute of Limitations and FAPE

The court held that Boffa’s claims concerning the Department’s failure to provide vision-related services were not barred by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s two-year statute of limitations. The court found that Boffa did not have reason to know about the severity of A.M.’s vision problems until September 2020 or later, when assessments identified the condition and she confirmed the diagnosis with an eye doctor in late 2021. The court therefore concluded that the claims reaching back to the 2009–10 school year were not time-barred to the extent they concerned vision-related services.

The court then deferred to the administrative findings that the Department failed to recommend vision services for A.M. It concluded that this failure denied A.M. a FAPE from the 2009–10 through 2021–22 school years. The court noted that the Department had issued multiple individualized education programs describing A.M. as needing vision services but did not evaluate her pronounced cortical visual impairment symptoms or recommend vision services until February 2022.

Remedy

The court found that the prolonged failure to provide vision education services was a gross violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Because traditional compensatory education would be burdensome and duplicative, the court awarded compensatory education in the form of extended eligibility for special-education services through age 25.

The court agreed with the state review officer that the Department could not be required to keep A.M. at iBrain or another private school throughout the extended-eligibility period. The court explained that the law requires periodic assessments and updated decisions about a student’s services and placement.

Pendency for the 2022–23 School Year

The court ruled that iBrain was A.M.’s temporary educational placement for the entire 2022–23 school year. Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, a student generally remains in her current educational placement while administrative proceedings are pending. The court held that iBrain became A.M.’s placement once the hearing officer found that it was appropriate and the Department did not appeal that finding.

The court applied that conclusion retroactively to July 6, 2022, when Boffa filed the due process complaint concerning the 2022–23 school year. It ruled that Boffa was entitled to tuition and transportation reimbursement from that date forward.

Attorneys’ Fees and Disposition

The court determined that Boffa was a prevailing party because she obtained meaningful relief on her claims. It held that she was entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, although the opinion did not set the fee amount. The court directed Boffa to file her fee application by February 28, 2025.

Judge Analisa Torres granted Boffa’s motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The parties were directed to file a proposed judgment by February 14, 2025, and the clerk was directed to terminate the two motions.