Murray v. The State of New York

Background

Michael John Murray brought this action without a lawyer and sought damages and injunctive relief under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The operative pleading was his Second Amended Complaint, filed after the court dismissed his first amended complaint but gave him an opportunity to correct identified deficiencies.

The Second Amended Complaint named the State of New York, the Graduate Center of the City University of New York (CUNY), and the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA). Murray had dropped the individual government officials named in the first amended complaint. His allegations concerned events dating from 1962 through 1998, including alleged problems involving a real-estate license record, CUNY administrative claims and student status, an alleged income execution order and garnishment, and a 1998 divorce judgment. He sought several forms of relief, including a declaration correcting alleged state-agency errors, vacatur of the divorce judgment, monetary payments, and retrieval of his CUNY papers.

Prior dismissal and governing standards

The court had previously construed Murray’s constitutional claims as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute that provides the remedy for constitutional violations by persons acting under state law. It dismissed the first amended complaint because claims against the State of New York and CUNY were barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, claims against NYCHA were outside Section 1983’s three-year limitations period in New York, and claims against the individual defendants were either untimely or did not adequately allege state action. The court granted leave to amend because Murray was proceeding without a lawyer.

The court explained that it could dismiss a self-represented complaint on its own initiative when the action was frivolous, when the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, or when the complaint failed to state a legally sufficient claim, provided the plaintiff had notice and an opportunity to respond. The court also applied the rule that self-represented pleadings should be read liberally, while noting that they still must provide enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief.

Section 1983 treatment

The court rejected Murray’s argument that his claims should not be treated as Section 1983 claims. It held that Section 1983 provides the federal remedy for alleged violations of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments when that remedy is available. The court therefore again analyzed the claims under Section 1983.

Claims against the State of New York and CUNY

The court dismissed the claims against the State of New York and CUNY because the Eleventh Amendment generally bars federal-court suits against a state and its arms unless the state consents or Congress validly removes the immunity. The court held that CUNY is an arm of the state. It also held that New York had not consented to Section 1983 suits in federal court.

Murray argued that a provision of New York law waived the State’s immunity. The court explained that the referenced provision, Section 8 of the New York Court of Claims Act, permits suits against New York in the New York Court of Claims subject to specified conditions, but does not waive New York’s Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court. The claims against the State of New York and CUNY were therefore dismissed on immunity grounds. The court also noted that Murray was not seeking the type of ongoing, prospective injunction against state officials that might fall within a narrow exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Claims against NYCHA

The court dismissed the Section 1983 claims against NYCHA as time-barred. It applied New York’s three-year limitations period for Section 1983 actions. Murray alleged that NYCHA issued the income execution order in 1987 and that related garnishment began in 1985. The court concluded that both alleged injuries occurred well outside the limitations period and that the complaint did not allege facts showing that Murray lacked knowledge of the injuries or that the limitations period should be paused. His allegation that he attempted to resolve the matter by sending a check to a creditor’s attorney confirmed his awareness of the alleged injury rather than supporting tolling.

Possible state-law claims

To the extent the Second Amended Complaint could be read to assert state-law claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them. Supplemental jurisdiction is a federal court’s discretionary authority to hear related state-law claims after federal claims are part of the case. Because the court dismissed all federal claims at this early stage, it dismissed any implied state-law claims without prejudice.

Leave to amend and final disposition

The court denied further leave to amend. It concluded that Murray had already received notice of the deficiencies and an opportunity to correct them, but his Second Amended Complaint made virtually no new factual allegations against the remaining defendants. The court found that another amendment would be futile because the problems were substantive and could not be cured through better pleading.

Judge Gregory H. Woods ordered that the action be dismissed without leave to amend. The court certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-free appeal status. It directed the Clerk to terminate the pending motion as moot, enter judgment for the State of New York, CUNY, and NYCHA, and close the case.