Frost v. Lion Brand Yarn Company

Background

Clarence Frost and Tammy Frost alleged that they are legally blind and depend on screen-reader technology to use the internet. The opinion states that Tammy Frost does not have eyes and is completely blind, while Clarence Frost has severe low vision. Tammy Frost alleged that she visited Lion Brand Yarn Company’s website several times to look for yarn and that, on at least three visits, the website gave her confusing, disorienting, and nonsensical information through her screen reader. The Frosts alleged that they could not navigate or understand the website or complete an online purchase without assistance.

The amended complaint described alleged accessibility problems involving pop-up windows, missing text alternatives for images such as yarn color swatches, drop-down menus that screen readers did not recognize, and information conveyed only through visual appearance or color. The Frosts alleged that automated and manual audits confirmed these problems. They stated that they intended to return to the website to find and purchase Lion Brand products.

The Frosts asserted claims under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Minnesota Human Rights Act. They alleged that Lion Brand’s website was a place of public accommodation and that its inaccessible content and services denied them equal access. They sought, among other things, class certification, a declaration, a permanent injunction, damages, costs, and attorney fees.

Issue and arguments

Lion Brand moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which asks whether a complaint alleges enough facts to plausibly state a legal claim. Lion Brand argued that Title III applies only to physical places of public accommodation and therefore does not apply to a website. At this stage, Lion Brand did not dispute that the Frosts had alleged that the website was inaccessible to people who require screen readers. Lion Brand also argued that, if the federal claim failed, the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Minnesota Human Rights Act claim and dismiss that claim without prejudice.

The parties agreed that the Eighth Circuit had not resolved whether a website is a place of public accommodation under Title III. The court reviewed conflicting decisions from other federal courts. Some courts had limited Title III to physical structures, while others had held that places of public accommodation can include nonphysical locations or services.

Court’s analysis

The court held that a website is a place of public accommodation for purposes of Title III. It found that the statute’s plain language did not resolve the issue and acknowledged that both sides had reasonable arguments. The court nevertheless rejected Lion Brand’s proposed interpretation.

First, the court concluded that earlier appellate decisions limiting some Title III claims to physical structures did not control this dispute. Those decisions involved whether insurance policies had to treat mental and physical disabilities equally, not whether a business could operate a website that denied disabled users equal access to goods and services. The court also stated that it disagreed with interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act to cover only physical structures.

Second, the court found that neither Title III’s operative language nor its list of public-accommodation categories expressly limits covered places to physical structures. The court emphasized that some service establishments can provide services without requiring customers to enter an office. It reasoned that excluding businesses that provide goods and services online would conflict with the law’s goal of eliminating disability discrimination and providing equal access.

Third, the court concluded that dictionary definitions of the word “place” did not settle the question. In the court’s view, those definitions included physical locations but did not establish that every place must be a physical structure. The court also relied on the Americans with Disabilities Act’s legislative history, which it said supports adapting the statute to changes in technology and does not limit its examples of public accommodations to the specific examples listed.

The court reasoned that a website operating a store can function as a sales or rental establishment. It compared inaccessible online shopping to physical barriers that prevent disabled customers from meaningfully accessing goods and services at a physical store. The court also rejected the argument that Congress’s failure to amend the statute expressly to mention websites showed an intent to exclude websites from Title III.

Disposition

The court held that Lion Brand’s stand-alone website falls within the meaning of a place of public accommodation under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The court’s order states: “Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.” The opinion does not state that the court separately ruled on the Minnesota Human Rights Act claim beyond denying the motion to dismiss.