D.J. v. Walnut Creek School District

Background

D.J., a minor represented by his parents as guardians ad litem, alleged that he has autism and needed constant supervision because of communication, safety, behavioral, and self-injury concerns. The Walnut Creek School District referred him under an Individualized Education Plan to Spectrum, a private institution. D.J. alleged that he experienced injuries and other mistreatment at Spectrum, including bruises, scratches, cuts, and injuries related to self-injurious behavior.

The complaint asserted three causes of action: failure to provide reasonable accommodations under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act; negligence and respondeat superior liability under state law; and negligent supervision under state law. Spectrum answered the complaint. The District moved under Rule 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint lacks a legally recognized theory or enough factual allegations to support a plausible claim.

Federal disability claims

The court explained that the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act require public schools to provide reasonable accommodations that give students with disabilities meaningful access to public education. D.J.’s complaint described the proposed accommodation mainly as placement in a setting that could meet his needs. The court held that this allegation was too conclusory because it did not explain what Spectrum could or should have done differently or how an adequate placement would have differed from Spectrum.

The court treated constant supervision as a more specific proposed accommodation. It concluded that D.J. sufficiently alleged that his parents requested constant supervision and that he was not constantly supervised during the December 12, 2022 incident involving a hand laceration, because Spectrum allegedly reported that there were no witnesses. The court therefore declined to dismiss the federal claims on the reasonable-accommodation ground to the extent they were based on that injury. The court dismissed the claims based on other incidents, with leave to amend, unless D.J. could identify another denied accommodation or allege that he was unsupervised during those events.

The court separately addressed exhaustion under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. It held that declaratory relief was available under that statute, so D.J. had to complete the statute’s administrative procedures before seeking comparable relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act or Rehabilitation Act. The court rejected D.J.’s argument that exhaustion was unnecessary because the claim could have been brought at a public facility other than a school. It concluded that the claim’s central concern was whether D.J. received the supervision and educational placement required for him, making the claim related to a free appropriate public education. The court also held that D.J.’s alleged settlement with the District did not establish exhaustion, and it did not decide whether the settlement’s asserted reservation of civil-rights claims could affect the exhaustion requirement. The request for declaratory relief was dismissed for failure to allege exhaustion.

For damages, the court stated that D.J. had to allege intentional discrimination, which can be shown through deliberate indifference. Deliberate indifference requires knowledge that harm to a federally protected right was substantially likely and a failure to act. The court held that the complaint did not adequately allege that an appropriate District official knew about the alleged failures at Spectrum and failed to respond. Allegations that the District knew or should have known about injuries or abuse were too conclusory, and allegations raised by counsel at the hearing about a District psychologist were not included in the complaint. The federal claims were therefore dismissed with leave to amend to the extent they sought compensatory damages.

State-law claims

The court held that California law generally does not impose liability on a public entity unless a statute provides a basis for liability. D.J. relied on California Education Code section 44808 and California Government Code section 815.2(a). The court concluded that section 44808 did not provide a basis on the alleged facts because D.J. did not allege that he was, or should have been, under the immediate and direct supervision of a District employee while at Spectrum. The court also held that section 815.2(a) did not support the claims as pleaded because the complaint did not identify conduct by a particular District employee that could plausibly constitute negligence. The state-law claims were dismissed with leave to amend.

Punitive damages and disposition

D.J. conceded that punitive damages could not be pursued against the District. The court granted the District’s motion as to punitive damages without leave to amend. Overall, Judge A J. Cisneros granted the District’s motion to dismiss and dismissed all claims against the District with leave to amend except the punitive-damages request. The court allowed D.J. to file an amended complaint by February 20, 2025.