Misfit Coffee Company, LLC v. Donatell

Background

Eric Marcel Turner was charged with possessing fentanyl intending to distribute it, possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Before counsel was appointed, Turner filed seven motions, including motions to suppress evidence, disclose informants and other witnesses, and obtain evidence favorable to the defense. United States Magistrate Judge John F. Docherty held two hearings and issued a report and recommendation addressing several of those motions. He denied Turner’s requests to disclose the identities of all informants and witnesses and recommended denying three suppression motions.

After counsel was appointed, Turner filed supplemental objections, another motion to suppress statements, and a motion to dismiss the indictment. The district court reviewed the report and recommendation de novo, meaning it independently reviewed the objected-to issues and the evidence presented at the hearings.

Search Warrants and Probable Cause

Turner argued that five warrants lacked probable cause: a warrant to place a tracking device on a Jeep, a warrant concerning the rent-roll records of an apartment complex, a warrant for a dog sniff at Apartment 607, a warrant to search the apartment, and a warrant to obtain Turner’s DNA. He challenged the use of a confidential reliable informant and an unwitting participant in controlled fentanyl purchases. He also argued that the apartment-related warrants relied improperly on Turner’s association with the apartment and the Jeep’s visits to the building.

The court accepted Judge Docherty’s conclusion that the warrants were supported by probable cause. It held that the informant’s prior reliable information and the completed first controlled purchase supported reliance on the informant. It also held that the apartment-related evidence went beyond mere association: the Jeep was registered to Turner, entered the building’s secured garage, and was connected to Apartment 607 through the garage opener, surveillance observations, and repeated short visits. Taken together, those facts gave the issuing judge a substantial basis to find a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be found.

Challenges to Affidavits and Request for a Franks Hearing

A Franks hearing is a hearing about whether an affidavit supporting a search warrant contains a knowingly or recklessly false statement or omission that matters to probable cause. Turner identified alleged inconsistencies concerning apartment-management statements, surveillance footage, the identity of a person seen at the apartment complex, the dog sniff, the dog’s qualifications, and the garage-door opener.

The court considered testimony from Detective Jeremiah Jessen at a January 22, 2025 hearing. It found that testimony highly credible and concluded that it undermined Turner’s claims that officers had lied or recklessly disregarded the truth. The court found no sufficient basis for additional Franks relief. It also held that, even if a disputed paragraph were removed from the DNA-warrant application, the remaining information was more than sufficient to establish probable cause.

Nighttime Execution of the Tracking Warrant

Turner argued that evidence obtained from the vehicle-tracking warrant should be suppressed because the tracker was placed shortly before 5 a.m., even though the warrant did not specify a time of execution. The court rejected the argument. It held that state-law violations do not ordinarily provide a basis for suppressing evidence in this federal case and that the federal warrant rule applies exclusively to federal searches. The court further stated that, even assuming the federal rule applied and was violated, suppression would require prejudice or reckless disregard of proper procedure. The court found no evidence of either. It credited Detective Jessen’s testimony that Minnesota tracking warrants of this type did not specify execution times and that he did not know a federal daytime-execution requirement applied.

Motion to Dismiss the Indictment

Turner argued that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits people convicted of felonies from possessing firearms, was unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him. The court held that the requested relief was foreclosed by the Eighth Circuit’s decisions in United States v. Jackson. It denied the motion to dismiss but stated that Turner’s constitutional arguments were preserved if the Supreme Court later provided relevant guidance.

Motion to Suppress Statements

Turner sought to suppress statements made after his arrest because officers had not given him the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona. The government agreed not to use some statements. The remaining disputed statement was Turner’s exclamation that he was “going back to prison for a long time.”

The court denied suppression of that statement. It found that Turner made the statement voluntarily and spontaneously, rather than in response to police interrogation. The court therefore held that the statement was admissible even without Miranda warnings.

Informant-Identity Disclosure

The court found no error in Judge Docherty’s denial of Turner’s request to identify the confidential reliable informant and the unwitting participant in the controlled purchases. It explained that the government has a limited privilege to withhold confidential informants’ identities and that Turner had not shown disclosure was necessary to his defense. Because the government later notified the court that it intended to offer evidence about the controlled purchases, the court stated that it would hear argument at the pretrial conference and decide whether any part of the disclosure ruling needed to be revisited.

Order and Disposition

Judge Menendez accepted the report and recommendation and overruled Turner’s objections. The order denied Turner’s First Motion to Suppress, Second Motion to Suppress, Motion to Suppress Evidence of Identification, newer Motion to Suppress, and Motion to Dismiss. The order did not state that any of these motions were denied with or without prejudice.