Lamour v. Musarra
- Clarke
- 1:24-cv-00903
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 4
In Lamour v. Musarra, Judge Clarke granted in part and denied in part a dismissal motion, rejecting objections and allowing limited amendment.
Donna Lamour’s foreclosure-related federal claims were subject to the jurisdiction ruling; the defendants obtained dismissal relief in part, while Lamour retained permission to amend within the stated limits.
What happened
Donna Lamour sued Thomas Musarra, Noel Quinn, Colin Bell, and Nelissa Sposato over an allegedly unlawful foreclosure sale, seeking to undo it and obtain other relief. Lamour represented herself. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction and improper service.
The court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation. It concluded that the foreclosure occurred in state court and that the Rooker-Feldman rule barred Lamour’s claims because they would require the federal court to review or reverse the state foreclosure judgment. The court also agreed that service was proper and timely.
Judge Jessica G. L. Clarke rejected Lamour’s objections, granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and allowed Lamour to amend only if she can state a plausible claim that does not require reviewing, changing, or reversing the state foreclosure judgment.
The detailed version
- Lamour v. Musarra · No. 1:24-cv-00903
- Clarke
- Feb. 13, 2025
Background
Donna Lamour, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Thomas Musarra, Noel Quinn, Colin Bell, and Nelissa Sposato. She sought injunctive relief, possession, and other relief that would effectively invalidate and reverse what she described as an unlawful and fraudulent foreclosure sale of her property.
The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and insufficient service of process. Magistrate Judge Aaron recommended granting the motion in part and denying it in part. The recommendation concluded that service was proper and timely, but that Lamour’s claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. That doctrine generally prevents a federal district court from reviewing or reversing a state-court judgment. The recommendation also advised allowing Lamour to amend if she could assert a plausible claim that did not require review, amendment, or reversal of the state foreclosure judgment.
Court’s Analysis
Lamour objected to the recommendation, arguing that Rooker-Feldman did not apply and that the federal court had subject-matter jurisdiction. She appeared to dispute whether the foreclosure proceeding took place in state court. The court determined that the county court involved in the foreclosure was a state court. Relying on the recommendation and applicable precedent, the court concluded that the other requirements for applying Rooker-Feldman were also satisfied.
Because the court determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, it did not address Lamour’s other arguments about the merits. The court explained that a federal court generally must determine its jurisdiction before deciding the underlying legal claims.
Disposition
Judge Jessica G. L. Clarke rejected Lamour’s objections and adopted Magistrate Judge Aaron’s Report and Recommendation in its entirety. The court ordered that the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The jurisdiction-based portion was granted, while the service-of-process portion was denied because service was found proper and timely. Lamour was granted leave to amend to the extent she can assert a plausible claim that does not require the federal court to review the state court’s foreclosure judgment. The clerk was directed to terminate the motion.
Read the full 4-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.