Milton v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation CTF- Soledad

Background

The case concerns an alleged July 20, 2020 incident called “Operation Akili” at Correctional Training Facility Soledad. The opinion states that six plaintiffs who were not present during the incident alleged that they later contracted COVID-19 as a result of it: William Pardue, on behalf of himself and the estate of his son Raemon Pardue; Robert Clark; Adam Sanford; Saul Pelayo; William Milton; and Vickter Estrada.

In an earlier order, the court dismissed Estrada, Pelayo, and Sanford with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. It also dismissed several claims with prejudice, including claims under the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act, the California Prevention of Terrorism Act, civil racketeering law, and civil-rights terrorism provisions. The remaining plaintiffs—Milton, Pardue, and Clark—asserted six causes of action in their amended complaint, including an Eighth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a racial-discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d), and state-law claims.

Legal standard

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally recognized claim supported by enough facts to make relief plausible. At this stage, the court accepts factual allegations as true and views them favorably to the plaintiffs, but the allegations must raise more than a speculative possibility of liability.

COVID-19-related claims

The defendants argued that Milton and Clark had not shown that the defendants caused their COVID-19 infections through Operation Akili. The court had previously emphasized that each COVID-19 plaintiff needed to prove that the defendants’ July 20, 2020 actions caused that plaintiff’s infection.

The amended complaint did not add facts about Milton’s experience or change the allegations about how Milton and Clark contracted COVID-19. The plaintiffs relied on a study concerning a superspreader event at a Boston hotel. The court stated that, even assuming the study supported the plaintiffs’ interpretation, it showed only that it was possible that the infections were genetically traceable to the strains allegedly introduced during Operation Akili. It did not show that the defendants were more likely the proximate cause of Milton’s or Clark’s infection, given the time that passed and the other variables affecting disease spread.

The court therefore dismissed all claims brought by Milton and Clark without leave to amend for failure to plausibly plead causation.

California Ralph Act

The court held that the plaintiffs still did not allege that they were personally subjected to violence or threats of violence during Operation Akili. Instead, they argued that they could bring a claim because they allegedly contracted COVID-19 through force used against other people. The court rejected that theory and dismissed the Ralph Act claim without leave to amend.

Battery, negligence, and negligent supervision

The court had previously dismissed the battery claim because none of the plaintiffs were directly involved in the July 20, 2020 events and the complaint did not allege that a defendant touched them. The amended complaint still did not allege that defendants used force against Milton or Clark. The court rejected their theory that injuries resulting from another person’s infection could support a battery claim and dismissed the battery claim without leave to amend.

The court dismissed the negligence claim without leave to amend to the extent it was based on the defendants’ alleged use of force, because the plaintiffs did not allege that force was used against them. It also dismissed Milton’s and Clark’s negligence claim without leave to amend to the extent it was based on a failure to use safety protections, maintain social distancing protocols, or minimize the spread of infectious diseases, because the plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged causation.

For negligent supervision, the court explained that a plaintiff must show that a supervisor knew beforehand that the supervised person had a tendency to commit the alleged wrongful act. The amended complaint still did not allege that the defendants had such prior knowledge regarding any California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation officer. The court dismissed this claim without leave to amend.

California Government Claims Act

The defendants argued that the required California Government Claims form was deficient as to Milton and Clark. Because the court dismissed all of their claims without leave to amend, it did not decide whether they complied with the California Government Claims Act.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. All claims brought by Robert Clark and William Milton were dismissed without leave to amend. The conclusion separately stated that the Ralph Act, state-law battery, state-law negligent supervision, and state-law negligence claims as to Milton and Clark were dismissed with prejudice.

William Pardue, on behalf of the estate of Raemon Pardue, was the sole remaining plaintiff. The surviving claims were an Eighth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on infliction of disease; a racial-discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d); and a state-law negligence claim limited to the alleged failure to use safety protections, maintain social distancing protocols, and minimize the spread of infectious diseases.