Cruz v. New York City Transit Authority

Background

Lisette Cruz worked in the defendants’ Compensation Division and became an Administrative Manager in December 2017. Her duties included supervising employees, ensuring that they answered telephones and responded to emails, and reviewing workers’ compensation cases.

In September 2021, Cruz requested permission to work fully remotely because of severe bilateral knee and back disabilities that made walking, standing for long periods, climbing stairs, and using the subway difficult. Her medical provider stated that Cruz had arthritis in both knees, severe pain, and difficulty climbing subway stairs or standing for long periods.

The defendants initially denied the request because their Occupational Health Services department found that the medical information was insufficient. After Cruz submitted additional medical information, Occupational Health Services determined that she qualified medically for a temporary two-month remote-work accommodation. The Human Resources Department then evaluated whether remote work was operationally feasible and whether it would create an undue hardship.

The defendants concluded that Cruz needed to be present in the office to perform the essential supervisory functions of her job. They also cited the Compensation Division’s claims backlog, staffing losses, and prior difficulties supervising employees remotely. The defendants denied the request again and recommended that Cruz use Access-A-Ride, a paratransit service. Cruz used Access-A-Ride but did not tell Human Resources that it was ineffective, did not submit another accommodation request, and did not appeal the second denial.

In September 2022, investigators reported seeing Cruz asleep at her desk. Other employees also reported seeing her asleep at work. Cruz was charged with sleeping on duty, gross misconduct, nonperformance of duty, and improper performance of duty. The defendants upheld the recommended dismissal on December 30, 2022.

Cruz sued under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. She alleged disability-based termination, failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, and failure to engage in an interactive process. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which asks whether the evidence shows that no reasonable jury could find for the opposing party.

Evidentiary objections

Cruz objected to portions of the defendants’ factual statements and declarations, including declarations from John J. Sweeney and Ronald Liburd. The court rejected those objections, finding that the declarations were based on personal knowledge and contained evidence that could be presented in admissible form.

The court also declined to strike the declaration of Baimusa Kamara. It found that Cruz had not properly presented a motion to strike, that such a motion was not the proper method for challenging a declaration, and that the declaration was based on Kamara’s personal knowledge. The court also found no demonstrated prejudice from the defendants’ failure to identify Kamara in their initial disclosures.

Rehabilitation Act accommodation claim

The court granted summary judgment on Count II, Cruz’s claim that the defendants unlawfully denied her a reasonable accommodation.

The court explained that a failure-to-accommodate claim generally requires proof that the plaintiff has a disability, the employer knew about it, the plaintiff could perform the job’s essential functions with a reasonable accommodation, and the employer refused to provide that accommodation. An employer may defeat the claim by showing that the requested accommodation would create an undue hardship.

The court first noted that Cruz’s 2021 accommodation request referred to her knee and back disabilities. The record did not show that she requested an accommodation based on insomnia or sleep apnea or told her supervisors that she had difficulty staying awake. The court also noted that Cruz was not diagnosed with sleep apnea until December 2023.

The court found no genuine dispute that in-person supervision was an essential function of Cruz’s job. Her responsibilities included supervising employees and ensuring that work was being performed. Based on the record, remote supervision did not allow managers to monitor employees effectively, check on their work in person, or mentor them adequately. The court therefore concluded that Cruz could not perform the essential functions of her position with the requested remote-work accommodation.

The court separately found that remote work would have imposed an undue hardship. The Compensation Division had a substantial backlog of claims, had lost managerial employees, and had experienced difficulties supervising employees remotely during the COVID-19 pandemic. The court also considered evidence that Cruz had fallen asleep during working hours while working remotely.

Because the court found that Cruz could not perform the essential functions of her job with the requested accommodation and that remote work would impose an undue hardship, it did not need to decide the defendants’ additional argument that Cruz failed to appeal the second denial or request another accommodation. The court granted summary judgment on Count II.

Rehabilitation Act termination claim

The court granted summary judgment on Count I, Cruz’s claim that the defendants terminated her because of her disability.

The court found that Cruz had not established a basic case of disability discrimination because the record showed that she could not perform the essential functions of her job, including remaining awake and alert while supervising employees. The court stated that Cruz did not dispute that being awake and conscious was an essential part of her work.

The court further ruled that, even if Cruz had established that initial showing, the defendants had identified a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination: sleeping at work and related misconduct. The defendants’ rules prohibited sleeping on Transit Authority property and allowed dismissal for violations of the rules, neglect of duty, or conduct harmful to efficiency or discipline. The court found that the investigation and disciplinary record supported the defendants’ stated reason.

Cruz argued that the rules did not apply to her because she was an administrator rather than a train or bus operator. The court rejected that argument, finding that the rules applied to all employees and that Cruz had acknowledged receiving them.

The court then found that Cruz had not produced evidence showing that the defendants’ stated reason was a pretext, meaning a false reason masking disability discrimination. The court therefore granted summary judgment on Count I.

State and city claims

The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Counts III through VII, which asserted claims under the New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law. Supplemental jurisdiction allows a federal court to hear related state-law claims along with federal claims, but the court may decline that jurisdiction after dismissing all federal claims.

The court concluded that the remaining state and city claims were better suited for New York state courts. It remanded those claims to New York state court.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Counts I and II. The court remanded Cruz’s remaining New York State and New York City Human Rights Law claims, Counts III through VII, to New York state court. The clerk was directed to terminate the motion and close the case.