Mahoney v. Facebook, Inc.

Background

Genevieve Mahoney asserted one claim against Meta Platforms, Inc. for defamation per se, meaning defamation based on a statement allegedly defamatory on its face. Her theory concerned Meta’s “Emergency News Statement” about the January 6, 2021 events at the U.S. Capitol. Mahoney alleged that the statement referred to people who posted photographs from the Capitol and that Meta’s later removal of her photograph and disabling of her Instagram account showed that the statement referred to her.

Meta filed two motions in one filing: a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which addresses whether a complaint adequately states a legal claim, and a special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. That statute provides an early procedure for challenging claims arising from protected speech or petitioning activity.

Motion to Dismiss

The court held that Mahoney’s second amended complaint still failed to state a defamation claim. Under the court’s description of California law, Mahoney needed to allege that Meta published a false statement to another person, that the person reasonably understood the statement to be about Mahoney, that the statement was defamatory on its face, and that Meta failed to use reasonable care to determine whether it was true or false.

The court identified three independent deficiencies:

1. The statement was not shown to be about Mahoney. Mahoney conceded that the Emergency News Statement did not name her. The court rejected her theory that the statement referred to her by implication. Meta removed her photograph and disabled her account nearly a week after the statement, so the alleged timing did not support the claim that people understood the statement to refer to her as someone whose photograph Meta had removed. The court also held that the statement concerned a group so large that it could not be understood as referring specifically to Mahoney.

2. Publication to a person who understood the statement as defamatory was not adequately alleged. The court found no plausible allegation that the student operating the @fur.meme Instagram account saw the Emergency News Statement or understood it as referring to Mahoney. The screenshots cited by Mahoney did not mention the statement. The court also found that the @fur.meme post indicated that the student learned of Mahoney’s attendance from Mahoney’s own Instagram activity, not from Meta’s statement.

3. A defamatory meaning was not adequately alleged. The court considered the statement as a whole and rejected Mahoney’s assertion that a reasonable person would understand it to mean that everyone who posted photographs from the protest was a criminal. Because the statement did not refer to Mahoney, the court concluded that it did not accuse her of a crime.

The court distinguished a Ninth Circuit case involving statements that, although not naming the plaintiffs, could be understood as referring to a small group of officers involved in a specific shooting. The court found that Meta’s statement instead referred to a much larger group and did not specifically describe Mahoney.

The court declined to permit another amended complaint. It noted that Mahoney had already received permission to amend and had not addressed the fundamental problems previously identified. The court found that further amendment would be futile.

Anti-SLAPP Motion

The court held that California’s anti-SLAPP statute applies in federal diversity proceedings under binding Ninth Circuit precedent. At the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, Meta had to show that Mahoney’s claim arose from protected activity. The court found that Meta’s decision to publish the Emergency News Statement on a publicly accessible platform concerned the January 6 events, an issue of public interest, and constituted protected speech.

At the second step, Mahoney had to show that her claim was legally sufficient and supported by a factual showing that could sustain a favorable judgment. The court held that she failed for the same reasons identified under Rule 12(b)(6): she did not sufficiently allege that a reasonable person would understand the statement to refer to her, did not adequately allege the required publication, and did not show that the statement was susceptible to a defamatory meaning. The court therefore granted Meta’s special motion to strike the defamation claim.

Attorney’s Fees and Disposition

Meta’s papers stated that it should receive attorney’s fees, but the court found that Meta had not clearly requested fees at that stage and had not complied with Civil Local Rule 54-5. The court denied the fee request without prejudice.

The court granted Meta’s motion to dismiss the second amended complaint, granted Meta’s special motion to strike under California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, and dismissed the action with prejudice.