Hildebrand v. Campbell

Background

Michael Hildebrand, a state prisoner representing himself, filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 2006 sentence from Santa Clara County Superior Court. He had pleaded no contest to six counts of lewd and lascivious conduct on a child by force and received a 36-year state-prison sentence.

Hildebrand previously filed a federal petition challenging the same conviction in 2010. That petition was dismissed as untimely, and both the district court and the Ninth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. In 2023, the court dismissed another federal petition without prejudice because Hildebrand had not exhausted state remedies. He later filed a petition in the California Supreme Court, which denied it as untimely and successive. Hildebrand filed the current federal petition on March 21, 2024.

Motion to Dismiss

Campbell moved to dismiss, arguing that the petition was second or successive, untimely, and procedurally barred. A second or successive federal habeas petition generally cannot be filed in the district court unless the petitioner first obtains authorization from the federal court of appeals.

Hildebrand argued that he filed the 2023 federal petition because of the district court’s instructions and did not intend for his letter to be treated as a habeas petition. He also argued that the court’s earlier order should have reset or superseded the limitations deadline. Campbell responded that the earlier orders did not address whether the petition was second or successive or reset the limitations period.

Court’s Analysis

The court held that the current petition was second or successive because it challenged the same 2006 conviction as Hildebrand’s earlier federal petition. The court stated that the 2023 case did not resolve the successive-petition issue or reset the filing deadline. Hildebrand had not presented an authorization order from the Ninth Circuit, so the district court dismissed the petition on that ground.

The court also held that the petition was untimely. It found that the limitations period for challenging the 2006 conviction expired on August 21, 2008. The state petition that Hildebrand filed to exhaust his newer claims did not change the calculation because it was filed after the federal limitations period had already expired. The current petition, filed on March 21, 2024, was therefore untimely.

Because the petition was subject to dismissal as second or successive and untimely, the court did not address Campbell’s procedural-default argument.

Disposition

The court granted Campbell’s motion to dismiss. It dismissed the petition as second or successive under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) and as untimely. The court stated that Hildebrand may file another petition in the district court only if he obtains the necessary order from the Ninth Circuit. The court denied a certificate of appealability and terminated the motion docket entry.