Carroll v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County

Background

Demetrius Latrice Carroll, identified in the opinion as a prisoner at the Central California Women’s Facility, filed this pro se civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She sued Sarah Bluestone, a Deputy Public Defender for Contra Costa County; Jennifer L. Velarde, a Deputy District Attorney for Contra Costa County; the Superior Court of Contra Costa County; and Judge John C. Cope. The claims concerned events during Carroll’s state criminal proceedings.

Carroll alleged that Bluestone, Velarde, and Judge Cope violated her speedy-trial rights by agreeing to a continuance that delayed her preliminary hearing by two days, for a total of twelve days. She also alleged that Velarde allowed a witness to testify while the witness was “obviously high and lying,” that the defendants engaged in acrimonious exchanges and exchanged favors, and that Judge Cope violated due process by stating during the preliminary hearing that he believed Carroll shot the victim. Carroll sought financial compensation, dismissal of her criminal charges, and removal of the defendants from their duties.

Screening and analysis

Because Carroll was a prisoner suing governmental entities and employees, the court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The court explained that it had to dismiss claims that were frivolous, malicious, failed to state a claim, or sought money from an immune defendant.

The court dismissed the speedy-trial claim. It said the claim repeated an identical claim dismissed in an earlier round of the case, was potentially barred by prosecutorial or judicial immunity, or failed to show a constitutional violation. To the extent the claim relied on California Penal Code § 859b, the court said a violation of state law was not enough to support a federal civil-rights claim.

The court dismissed the claim concerning the witness’s testimony because Carroll did not provide details about the witness, the allegedly false testimony, or resulting prejudice. The court also concluded that Velarde’s conduct in eliciting testimony during a criminal hearing was closely connected to the judicial phase of the prosecution and therefore was protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity.

The court dismissed the claim based on Judge Cope’s statement because the statement was made during a preliminary hearing and was a normal judicial act. The court concluded that judicial immunity protected Judge Cope from civil damages liability for that conduct.

The court dismissed the claim about acrimonious exchanges and exchanged favors because Carroll did not explain how those allegations violated due process. It also stated that prosecutorial and judicial immunity likely applied to conduct during the criminal proceedings and that Bluestone, acting as Carroll’s public defender, was not acting under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

The court dismissed all claims against the Superior Court. It relied on the absence of allegations identifying the court’s own misconduct and on Ninth Circuit precedent treating a state superior court as an arm of the state protected by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.

The court also stated that a challenge seeking release from custody must be brought through a petition challenging the lawfulness or duration of confinement, rather than through a § 1983 action. Because Carroll also sought money damages, the court analyzed the civil-rights claims but did not provide release through this lawsuit.

Disposition

The court denied leave to amend, finding that the claims against Velarde and Judge Cope were barred by absolute immunity, the claims against the Superior Court were barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, and the claims against Bluestone failed because a public defender is not a state actor for § 1983 purposes. The court ordered that the complaint be dismissed.

The court granted Carroll leave to proceed in forma pauperis, meaning she could proceed without paying the filing fee in advance. It stated that the filing fee was $350.00 and that the initial partial filing fee due at that time was $0.00. Judge Edward M. Chen signed the order on February 21, 2025.