Stone 1 v. Annucci

Background

Six currently and formerly incarcerated plaintiffs brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against officials of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision. They alleged that they were sexually abused while in the agency’s custody and that officials and staff knew of an imminent threat of sexual assault but deliberately failed to protect them.

In February 2023, the magistrate judge entered a stipulated protective order governing materials exchanged during discovery. The order allowed counsel to designate proprietary, trade-secret, or otherwise sensitive non-public information as confidential and limited disclosure of that information to specified categories of people.

After plaintiffs learned of prior accusations of sexual misconduct against certain corrections officers, they sought to modify the protective order. They wanted to show documents obtained in discovery to lawyers for non-party complainants who might be witnesses. Over defendants’ objection, the magistrate judge entered revised orders on May 9 and May 10, 2024. The revised protective order allowed confidential documents to be disclosed to counsel for inmates or former inmates with pending sexual-abuse claims against New York State, the corrections department, or its staff.

Standard of review

The parties agreed that the orders concerned discovery and were not dispositive of the litigation. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), a district court may set aside a magistrate judge’s nondispositive order if it is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. A decision is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court has a firm conviction that a mistake was made. A decision is contrary to law when it fails to apply, or misapplies, relevant statutes, case law, or procedural rules.

Court’s analysis

The court held that the revised protective order was both clearly erroneous and contrary to law. Rule 26(c) allows courts to issue protective orders for good cause to protect parties and witnesses from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. The court explained that protective orders are commonly used when discovery includes private or potentially embarrassing information.

The court found that the revised order gave plaintiffs broad discretion to release confidential discovery materials to a large group of non-parties, regardless of the materials’ subject matter or whether those recipients would otherwise have a right to obtain them. The materials could include personal medical records, statements by plaintiffs and witnesses about sensitive topics, personnel records, and confidential corrections-department documents. The court was particularly concerned that the order could allow release of materials unrelated to a potential witness and that leaked medical or other personal records could be difficult to trace.

The court also emphasized that there is a strong presumption against modifying a protective order after parties or witnesses have reasonably relied on it. Modification generally requires a showing that the original order was improvidently granted, or that an extraordinary circumstance or compelling need exists. Plaintiffs did not argue that the original order was improperly granted, and the court found no extraordinary circumstance or compelling need. It also found that the revised order was not appropriately limited to documents relevant to potential witnesses or to non-parties who could otherwise obtain the materials.

The court noted that the magistrate judge had not identified the applicable standards or made findings supporting the modification. The magistrate judge also had not considered the reliance interests of the parties and witnesses or the effects of releasing sensitive non-public information. Although plaintiffs argued that modification was needed to allow lawyers to review prior statements and related documents with potential witnesses, the court found those arguments insufficient to justify the revised order’s broad disclosure authorization.

The court declined to consider a declaration submitted by defendants describing security risks because Rule 72(a) generally prevents a district court from considering factual evidence that was not presented to the magistrate judge. The court nonetheless concluded from the existing record that the documents were extremely sensitive and that the revised order improperly undermined the original order’s purpose of limiting exposure.

Disposition

The court granted defendants’ motion to set aside the May 9 and May 10, 2024 orders. It directed the Clerk of Court to close the motion pending at ECF No. 184. The decision addressed discovery and the protective order; it did not resolve the merits of plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims.