Christopher v. Dakota County
- Katherine Menendez
- 0:22-cv-02267
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 17
In Christopher v. Dakota County, Judge Menendez partly granted summary judgment, dismissing claims against two officers while allowing claims against Ruark and Dakota County to continue.
The claims against correctional officers Sloane McPherson and Michel Franson were dismissed with prejudice. The claims against correctional officer Brady Ruark and Dakota County remain, including Christopher’s Fourteenth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against Ruark and the state-law negligence claim and related official-immunity issues.
What happened
Tywan G. Christopher alleged that Dakota County correctional officers failed to protect him from an inmate who threatened and later assaulted him in the jail. He also brought a state-law negligence claim against Officer Brady Ruark and sought to hold Dakota County responsible as Ruark’s employer.
The court concluded that no reasonable jury could find Officers Sloane McPherson and Michel Franson liable on Christopher’s constitutional claims, so it dismissed all claims against them with prejudice. But the court found that factual disputes required a jury to decide whether Ruark disregarded a serious risk to Christopher’s safety and whether Ruark and Dakota County were protected by official immunity on the negligence claim.
Judge Katherine Menendez accepted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, overruled the defendants’ objection, and granted in part and denied in part the motion for summary judgment. The claims against Dakota County and Ruark remain, and the parties were ordered to schedule a settlement conference before trial.
The detailed version
- Christopher v. Dakota County · No. 0:22-cv-02267
- Katherine Menendez
- Feb. 25, 2025
Background
Tywan G. Christopher alleged that, while he was a pretrial detainee at the Dakota County Jail, another inmate, identified as “D.M.,” threatened him during a church service and assaulted him a few days later. Christopher claimed that correctional officers Sloane McPherson and Michel Franson failed to do enough to protect him after the threat. He also claimed that correctional officer Brady Ruark failed to protect him when Christopher expressed concern about being placed near D.M. Christopher alleged that Ruark was negligent under Minnesota law and that Dakota County was responsible for Ruark’s conduct as his employer.
The defendants moved for summary judgment, which asks whether the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to rule for the opposing party. Magistrate Judge Douglas L. Micko recommended granting the motion in part and denying it in part: dismissing all claims against McPherson and Franson with prejudice while allowing the claims against Ruark and Dakota County to remain. Dakota County and Ruark objected to that recommendation, and Christopher responded.
Claims Against McPherson and Franson
Christopher did not object to the recommendation favoring McPherson and Franson. The court found that the recommendation was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law. It concluded that Christopher had not identified evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that either officer violated his constitutional rights. The court therefore accepted the recommendation and dismissed all claims against McPherson and Franson with prejudice.
Claims Against Ruark
Christopher’s failure-to-protect claim arose under the Fourteenth Amendment because he was a pretrial detainee. The court explained that the claim required evidence that Christopher faced a substantial risk of serious harm and that Ruark was deliberately indifferent—that is, that Ruark consciously disregarded that risk.
The court rejected Ruark’s argument that D.M.’s threats showed only a risk of harm outside the jail. Viewing the evidence in Christopher’s favor, the court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that D.M.’s threats, statements, and later assault showed a substantial risk of serious harm inside the jail. The court also rejected Ruark’s argument that Christopher reported only a general fear. Christopher testified that he told a guard about the earlier incident, expressed concern about being near D.M., and asked that they not be placed in the same area.
The court found a factual dispute about whether Christopher made that report to Ruark. Christopher identified the guard who made the transfer decision by description, and Ruark denied that Christopher told him about the danger. The court also found that a jury could conclude that, after hearing Christopher’s concerns, Ruark dismissed them without investigating. Because deciding which account was more credible is a jury’s role at summary judgment, the court denied summary judgment on the Fourteenth Amendment claim against Ruark.
State-Law Negligence and Official Immunity
Ruark argued that official immunity protected him from Christopher’s state-law negligence claim. The court rejected the argument that Christopher had forfeited the issue of willfulness by not addressing it directly in the portion of his brief discussing official immunity. The court found that Christopher’s other arguments showed his position that Ruark intentionally disregarded a risk to his safety.
The court further concluded that a jury should decide whether Ruark was entitled to official immunity. It also concluded that Dakota County was not entitled to summary judgment based on vicarious official immunity. The negligence-related claims therefore remain for further proceedings.
Disposition
Judge Katherine Menendez accepted the Report and Recommendation, overruled the defendants’ objection, and ordered that the motion for summary judgment be granted in part and denied in part. All claims against McPherson and Franson were dismissed with prejudice. All claims against Dakota County and Ruark remain. The parties were ordered to contact Magistrate Judge Douglas L. Micko’s chambers to schedule a final settlement conference before trial.
Read the full 17-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.