Daramola v. Dungarvin Incorporated, Minnesota

Background

Femi Joseph Daramola sued Dungarvin Incorporated, his former employer, and Lura Marie Solie, his former supervisor. He alleged that Dungarvin employed him as a mental health specialist beginning in February or March 2022 and discharged him on March 31, 2023. He alleged that the discharge occurred because he is a Black man, violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

In his complaint and response to the dismissal motion, Daramola also described long work periods without breaks or time off, ignored complaints about stress and smoke in clients’ homes, changes to his shifts without acceptable notice, and more favorable treatment of employees who were not of the same race. He further alleged that Dungarvin and Solie falsified or altered training documents and made false statements during a Minnesota Department of Human Services investigation involving a vulnerable adult.

Motion to Dismiss Standard

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. At this stage, the court treated well-pleaded factual allegations as true and viewed reasonable inferences in Daramola’s favor. Because Daramola represented himself, the court construed his filings liberally and considered allegations in his response and related materials as required by the authorities it cited.

Forced-Labor and Other Statutory Claims

The court concluded that Daramola failed to state a forced-labor claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1589, part of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. The court found that he did not allege facts showing that Dungarvin intended to coerce him to remain in his job or used force, threatened force, physical restraint, abuse of legal process, or a scheme designed to make him believe that refusing to work would cause serious harm. The opinion states that the § 1589 claims are dismissed.

The court also concluded that Daramola could not bring civil claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1513, 1621, or 1623, which concern retaliation against witnesses or informants, perjury, and false declarations. The court found that those criminal statutes do not provide a private right of action. It reached the same conclusion for 8 U.S.C. § 1324, which the opinion describes as addressing criminal penalties concerning bringing into the United States and harboring certain aliens.

Title VII Claims

The court rejected the defendants’ argument that the Title VII claims should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Daramola attached an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission right-to-sue letter dated December 4, 2023. The court found that the letter created a factual issue about the extent of exhaustion that could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss. The court likewise rejected dismissal based on the statute of limitations, reasoning that the right-to-sue letter supported an inference that Daramola filed an administrative charge before receiving the letter.

The court dismissed Daramola’s Title VII claims against Solie because Title VII does not provide for individual liability against a supervisor. In the discussion, the court described those claims as dismissed with prejudice.

The court allowed Daramola’s Title VII claims against Dungarvin to proceed. It found that he plausibly alleged that he belonged to a protected racial group, suffered an adverse employment action through termination, was qualified for his position, and was treated less favorably than employees who were not of the same race. The court emphasized that allowing the claim to proceed did not decide whether Daramola would ultimately prevail.

Disposition

The order states that the defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. It grants the motion as to Daramola’s Title VII claims against Solie and his claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1513, 1621, and 1623 and 8 U.S.C. § 1324. It otherwise denies the motion, allowing the Title VII claims against Dungarvin to remain in the case. The opinion’s discussion separately states that the forced-labor claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1589 are dismissed, although the enumerated final order does not list those claims in the section describing what is granted.