Cruz v. New York City Transit
- Analisa Torres
- 1:24-cv-00089
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 8
In Cruz v. New York City Transit, Judge Torres adopted a recommendation and dismissed Cruz’s discrimination, retaliation, and harassment claims under several laws.
Marisol Cruz’s claims were dismissed in full, with some dismissals allowing possible refiling or amendment and others barring refiling. The defendants prevailed on the motion to dismiss. The order allowed Cruz to seek leave to amend by March 18, 2025, subject to specified filing requirements.
What happened
In Cruz v. New York City Transit, former station agent Marisol Cruz, representing herself, claimed that the New York City Transit Authority and several individuals discriminated and retaliated against her because of religion and disability. Her claims concerned unpaid leave and denied accommodation requests, alleged harassment after she returned to work, and her 2023 termination.
The court dismissed all claims. It dismissed some claims with prejudice because Cruz had already litigated them before the New York State Division of Human Rights or in arbitration, dismissed other federal claims without prejudice because she had not completed required administrative steps, declined to hear related state-law claims, and dismissed her criminal-harassment claim with prejudice for failure to state a claim.
Judge Analisa Torres overruled Cruz’s objections and adopted the report and recommendation in full. The order allowed Cruz to seek permission to amend by March 18, 2025, if she submitted the required proposed complaint and supporting materials.
The detailed version
- Cruz v. New York City Transit · No. 1:24-cv-00089
- Analisa Torres
- Feb. 26, 2025
Background
Marisol Cruz, representing herself, sued the New York City Transit Authority—identified in the caption as “New York City Transit Authority - MTA”—and Martense Avitus, Afiya Garcia-Austin, Tanya Forrester, Sandrea Flowers, Deborah Felice, Sade Kronagay, and R. Wallace. Cruz alleged discrimination and retaliation based on religion and disability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. She also asserted a claim under New York’s criminal statute prohibiting aggravated harassment.
The allegations involved three periods: unpaid leave in early 2022 after Cruz refused masking and test-or-vaccine requirements and sought an accommodation; alleged harassment after she returned to work in July 2022; and her termination in 2023. The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which addresses subject-matter jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6), which addresses whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The court referred the motion for a report and recommendation. Judge Henry J. Ricardo recommended dismissing the complaint in full, and Cruz objected.
Court’s Analysis
Judge Torres reviewed the challenged portions of the recommendation under the applicable standards and reviewed the remainder for clear error. The court found no clear error and concluded that Cruz’s general objections did not undermine the recommendation.
The court agreed that Cruz’s New York State Human Rights Law claims arising from the COVID-related accommodation allegations and the portions of the post-return harassment allegations that she had litigated before the New York State Division of Human Rights were barred by that prior proceeding. The court also agreed that her related Americans with Disabilities Act, Title VII, and New York City Human Rights Law claims were barred by claim-preclusion and issue-preclusion principles because they involved the same factual grouping or issues already litigated.
For Americans with Disabilities Act and Title VII claims based on allegations that were not presented to the state agency, the court agreed that Cruz had not shown that she completed the required administrative process. The court therefore adopted the recommendation to dismiss those claims without prejudice. The court also agreed that Cruz’s retaliation claims arising from her 2023 termination were barred by issue preclusion after an arbitrator found no basis to conclude that the defendants’ actions were retaliatory.
The court further agreed that the individual defendants could not be held individually liable under the Americans with Disabilities Act or Title VII. Because the federal claims were dismissed, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—its authority to hear related state-law claims—over Cruz’s remaining New York State and New York City Human Rights Law claims based on post-agency allegations. Finally, the court agreed that New York Penal Law § 240.30 does not provide a private right of action for Cruz’s aggravated-harassment claim.
Disposition
Judge Torres overruled Cruz’s objections and adopted the report and recommendation in full. The order states:
- Cruz’s New York State Human Rights Law claims arising from the COVID-related accommodation allegations and the portions of the post-return harassment allegations litigated before the state agency were dismissed, with prejudice, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
- Cruz’s Americans with Disabilities Act, Title VII, and New York City Human Rights Law claims related to those same allegations were dismissed, with prejudice, as barred by claim preclusion and issue preclusion.
- Cruz’s Americans with Disabilities Act and Title VII claims based on post-return harassment allegations that post-dated the state-agency complaint were dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
- Cruz’s claims arising from the 2023 termination allegations were dismissed, with prejudice, as barred by issue preclusion.
- Cruz’s New York State and New York City Human Rights Law claims based on post-return harassment allegations that post-dated the state-agency complaint were dismissed, without prejudice, for lack of supplemental subject-matter jurisdiction.
- Cruz’s aggravated-harassment claim under New York Penal Law § 240.30 was dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim.
The order stated that any motion for leave to amend had to be filed by March 18, 2025, with a proposed amended complaint, a redline or description of changes, and a memorandum explaining how the proposed amendments addressed the identified deficiencies. The clerk was directed to terminate the motions at ECF Nos. 30 and 58 and mail the order to Cruz.
Read the full 8-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.