Lin v. Shim

Background

Nelson Lin, who was representing himself, sued New York Family Court Judge Jonathan H. Shim, June Hou, Marx Rivera, and other defendants. The action invoked federal-question and related jurisdiction and asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for due-process, equal-protection, and First Amendment violations, as well as a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. The claims arose from child-custody proceedings pending in the Family Court of the State of New York, County of New York.

Lin alleged that Judge Shim’s December 6, 2022 order reduced Lin’s parenting time from 50% physical custody to indefinite supervised visitation without a meaningful opportunity to be heard, a new trial on allegations involving Rivera, or an opportunity to present witnesses and evidence. Lin also challenged a January 16, 2025 Family Court order directing that he could not file further motions in the custody litigation without court permission.

Lin asked the federal court to issue an order to show cause and emergency relief that would, among other things, stop enforcement of the December 6, 2022 visitation order, restore his prior custody arrangement, remove the January 16, 2025 filing restriction, stay the Family Court proceedings, prohibit further alleged retaliation by Judge Shim, and require the defendants to preserve and disclose exculpatory evidence.

Preliminary-Injunction Standard

The court explained that temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are extraordinary remedies. Lin had to show irreparable harm and either a likelihood of success on the merits or sufficiently serious questions supporting litigation combined with a balance of hardships that strongly favored him. The court concluded that Lin had shown neither a likelihood of success nor sufficiently serious questions and therefore was not entitled to the requested relief.

Claims Against Judge Shim

The court held that Lin’s claims against Judge Shim for damages and injunctive relief under Sections 1983 and 1985 were barred by judicial immunity. Judges are generally immune from damages claims for actions taken within their judicial responsibilities, even when the plaintiff alleges bad faith or malice. The court found that the challenged rulings and statements arose from custody litigation over which Judge Shim was presiding and therefore were judicial actions taken within his jurisdiction.

The court also noted that Section 1983 generally bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. Lin had not alleged a violation of a declaratory decree, and the court found that declaratory relief was available through New York’s appellate courts.

Claims Against the Private Defendants

For a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that each defendant acted under color of state law. The court explained that private parties generally are not liable under Section 1983 and that private attorneys, attorneys for children, and court-appointed psychologists generally are not state actors merely because they participate in court proceedings.

The court found that Lin had not shown that the defendants other than Judge Shim were state actors. It therefore concluded that Lin had no likelihood of success and had not raised sufficiently serious questions concerning his Section 1983 claims against those defendants.

The court also addressed Lin’s Section 1985(3) conspiracy claim. Such a claim requires allegations of a conspiracy, an intent to deprive someone of equal protection or equal privileges, an act advancing the conspiracy, and an injury or deprivation of rights. It also requires an allegation that the conspiracy was motivated by racial or another class-based discriminatory purpose. The court found that Lin alleged, at most, personal bias by Hou and Rivera and made only a conclusory assertion about gender bias in custody disputes. It concluded that these allegations did not demonstrate a likelihood of success or sufficiently serious questions supporting the requested relief.

Interference with the Family Court Proceedings

The court held that the relief Lin sought would require federal interference with an ongoing state custody proceeding. It concluded that the Younger abstention doctrine, the domestic-relations abstention doctrine, and the federal Anti-Injunction Act each precluded the requested intervention.

Under Younger abstention, federal courts generally do not interfere with certain ongoing state proceedings, including proceedings involving a state’s interest in enforcing its court orders and judgments. The court determined that the pending custody proceeding implicated that doctrine and that Lin’s allegations of bias and irregularity were not enough to establish an applicable exception.

The domestic-relations abstention doctrine also required the federal court to refrain from exercising federal-question jurisdiction over claims concerning state custody orders when those issues could be fully and fairly determined in state court. The court found that principle applicable to Lin’s request to intervene in the New York Family Court proceedings.

Finally, the Anti-Injunction Act generally prohibits federal courts from enjoining state-court proceedings unless one of three statutory exceptions applies. Although Section 1983 actions may fall within one exception, the court concluded that Lin had not shown a likelihood of success on a cognizable Section 1983 claim or sufficiently serious questions warranting an injunction under that exception.

Disposition

The court denied in its entirety Lin’s request for an order to show cause seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunctive relief. The order resolved docket entry 23. It did not state that the underlying action or any claim was dismissed.