Stockton v. Smith

Background

Robert John Stockton, a prisoner housed at Pelican Bay State Prison, filed this self-represented action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims against state actors for violating federal rights. He sought damages, litigation costs, and a preliminary injunction requiring that he be housed at another prison.

The amended complaint named warden Steven Smith; correctional counselors C. Durham and J. Juneau; lieutenants Harlen and Burge; and correctional officer C. Bartley. Stockton alleged, among other things, that officials placed an enemy prisoner in contact with him; that Bartley used excessive force after demanding an unclothed search; that officials imposed unsanitary or degrading conditions in administrative segregation; that prison officials restricted tablet applications; that Burge required a Miranda waiver while reviewing a grievance; and that prison staff retaliated against him for litigation activities.

Leave to Amend

The court granted Stockton’s request to file the first amended complaint. The court noted that the initial complaint had not yet been screened and that the defendants had not been served.

Screening and Dismissal

Under the prisoner-screening statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court had to identify claims that were legally sufficient and dismiss claims that were frivolous, malicious, failed to state a claim, or sought money from an immune defendant. The court dismissed the amended complaint with leave to amend because of numerous deficiencies.

First, the court found that the complaint violated the joinder rule. Claims against multiple defendants may be joined in one action only when they arise from the same transaction or series of transactions and share a common legal or factual question. The court stated that Stockton’s claim concerning the placement of inmate Winson and his claim concerning Bartley’s alleged use of excessive force arose from different events and did not share a common legal or factual question. The court directed Stockton to choose claims that satisfy the joinder requirements and to bring separate actions for claims arising from separate events.

Second, the court explained that § 1983 does not impose liability merely because one person supervises an alleged wrongdoer. A defendant must have personally caused the deprivation of a federal right. Thus, to the extent Stockton sued Smith only because Smith supervised subordinates, that theory did not state a legally recognized § 1983 claim.

Third, the court explained that reviewing or denying a prisoner grievance generally does not make the reviewer personally liable for the underlying constitutional violation. The court found no allegations supporting an inference that Burge knew Bartley would use excessive force based on Burge’s review of an earlier grievance about Bartley’s demand for an unclothed search.

Fourth, the court stated that a violation of Miranda’s protective rules does not automatically create a constitutional violation for which § 1983 damages may be recovered. The court also stated that Miranda does not provide a right to sue for damages under § 1983.

Fifth, the court explained that placing a prisoner in more restrictive conditions for nonpunitive reasons generally does not violate due process. The court cited the principle that administrative segregation and related hardships do not, by themselves, create a protected right to remain in the general prison population.

The court ordered Stockton to file a second amended complaint within 28 days. The new complaint had to use the required caption and case number, state “SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT” on its first page, include all claims and defendants he wished to pursue, and not incorporate earlier complaints by reference. The court warned that failure to comply could result in dismissal for failure to state a claim, failure to prosecute, or failure to comply with a court order.

Appointment of Counsel

Stockton requested appointed counsel, citing his head injury, lack of legal materials and copying access, administrative segregation, missing legal documents, isolation, and inability to afford a lawyer. The court explained that appointment of counsel in a civil case is discretionary and generally requires exceptional circumstances, including consideration of the plaintiff’s likelihood of success and ability to present the claims in light of their complexity.

The court found that Stockton had adequately presented his claims and that the issues were not complex. Because the case was at an early stage, the court could not assess his likelihood of success. The court therefore denied his requests for appointment of counsel, without prejudice to the court appointing counsel later if circumstances required.

Disposition

The court granted leave to file the first amended complaint, dismissed the first amended complaint with leave to amend, and denied Stockton’s requests for appointment of counsel.