C21K Company Limited v. Gindi C21 IP LLC

Document and procedural posture

The supplied text is a February 14, 2025 pre-motion letter from counsel for Defendant Gindi C21 IP LLC to Judge P. Kevin Castel. It notifies the court of a planned motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which concerns whether a complaint adequately states a legal claim. The text does not contain a court ruling or disposition of that proposed motion.

Background

According to the letter, C21K Company Limited filed the action on October 11, 2024. The letter states that C21K and Gindi entered into a license agreement on November 16, 2020, under which Gindi agreed to license the “Century 21 Marks” to C21K and authorize C21K to open and operate Century 21 department stores in South Korea. The agreement reportedly provides that New York law governs the parties’ rights and obligations.

The letter says C21K alleges that Gindi breached the license agreement by terminating it and, at a minimum, refusing to allow C21K to open and operate the stores. C21K also allegedly claimed that Gindi interfered with contracts involving several vendors by warning them between May 2021 and June or July 2021 to stop doing business with C21K. The letter states that C21K did not identify the specific vendor agreements, their terms, or any actual breach by a vendor.

Defendant’s proposed arguments

Gindi’s counsel says the proposed motion would seek dismissal of C21K’s tortious-interference-with-contracts claim and negligent-interference-with-contracts claim.

The letter advances four principal arguments concerning the interference claims:

1. Statute of limitations. The letter argues that New York’s three-year limitations period began when the alleged interference occurred. Because C21K alleged interference no later than June or July 2021 and filed suit in October 2024, Gindi argues that the claims are time-barred.

2. Duplicative contract theory. Gindi argues that the interference claims are based on the same conduct underlying C21K’s breach-of-contract claim and therefore improperly duplicate that claim.

3. No negligent-interference claim under New York law. The letter asserts that New York recognizes intentional interference with contract rights, but not negligent interference with contract rights.

4. Insufficient allegations of intentional interference. The letter argues that C21K did not adequately allege specific vendor contracts, Gindi’s actual knowledge of those contracts, the specific warnings allegedly made to vendors, causation, justification or the required additional misconduct, an actual vendor breach, or damages. The letter also argues that Gindi’s alleged conduct followed termination of the license agreement and reflected Gindi’s asserted interest in preventing unauthorized use of its intellectual property and protecting its vendor relationships.

Disposition

The supplied text does not state that Judge Castel granted, denied, or otherwise decided Gindi’s proposed motion. It only presents the defendant’s arguments and a proposed briefing schedule. The court’s ruling and the ultimate status of the claims are therefore not shown in the provided material.