Awad v. Extended Nursing Personnel

Background

Russell Awad sued Extended Nursing Personnel and Girling Health Care of New York, Inc., alleging discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. He alleged that he was terminated after requesting a religious exemption from Extended Nursing’s COVID-19 vaccination policy. His stated religious objection was based on his belief that the available vaccines involved fetal cell lines and that receiving a vaccine would conflict with his opposition to abortion.

Awad worked as a case manager for Extended Nursing. Shortly after he was hired, he and Extended Nursing signed an arbitration agreement. The agreement required covered disputes that could otherwise be brought in court to be resolved exclusively through binding arbitration. It expressly included claims under Title VII, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The agreement also referred to parents, subsidiaries, agents, affiliates, successors, and assigns of Extended Nursing as part of the covered company.

The parties disputed Girling’s relationship with Extended Nursing. Defendants asserted that Girling acquired Extended Nursing after Awad’s termination and was never his employer. Awad asserted that Girling was his employer or co-employer, helped determine employment policies, and was responsible for conduct leading to his termination. The court stated that the dispute about the acquisition did not affect the arbitration decision.

Motion to Compel Arbitration

The court granted Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. It found that Awad and Extended Nursing had entered into a valid arbitration agreement because both had signed it and the agreement clearly identified the parties and its material terms. Awad did not challenge the agreement’s validity; instead, he argued that the ownership dispute made it unclear whether he had agreed to arbitrate with a specific party. The court rejected that argument.

The court further held that the agreement clearly and unmistakably delegated questions about arbitrability—meaning whether a dispute must be arbitrated—to the arbitrator. The agreement incorporated the American Arbitration Association’s employment rules, which give an arbitrator authority to decide questions about the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement. The agreement was also broad and covered disputes under the laws supporting Awad’s claims. The court therefore directed that questions about whether the claims fell within the agreement be decided in arbitration.

The court also held that Girling could compel arbitration even though it did not sign the agreement. The agreement extended arbitration rights to entities such as affiliates, successors, and assigns. The court reasoned that Girling could invoke that provision if, as Defendants asserted, it was a related entity or successor. Alternatively, if Awad’s allegations that Girling was his co-employer were accepted, his claims against both defendants arose from the same alleged conduct and were sufficiently connected to the signed agreement. Under either version of the parties’ facts, the court concluded that Girling could compel arbitration.

Stay of the Case

Because all of Awad’s claims were sent to arbitration, the court stayed the case while arbitration proceeds. The parties were directed to update the court about the arbitration’s outcome within three business days after it ends.

Disposition

The court’s conclusion states: “Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED” and “this case is STAYED pending the resolution of the arbitration.” The opinion does not state a separate disposition of Defendants’ alternative motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.