Kumar v. Alhunaif

Background

Leena Kumar alleged that she worked as a housekeeper for Barrak Abdulmohsen Alhunaif and Khaledah Saad Aldhubaibi from approximately May through October 2017. She alleged that the defendants physically abused and threatened her, required extremely long hours, withheld wages, restricted her access to her passport and visa, and threatened her with arrest if she tried to leave. According to the complaint, she was nominally paid $2,000 per month but was required to return $1,300, leaving her with $700 per month.

Kumar brought claims under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act and New York Labor Law. The opinion concerns only Alhunaif because Aldhubaibi had not been served or appeared. The court previously authorized Kumar to serve Alhunaif by email, text message, WhatsApp, and Facebook Messenger after Kumar could not locate his physical address despite reasonable efforts. Kumar completed service through those methods, and the clerk later entered Alhunaif’s default after he failed to respond.

Relief from Default

The court treated Alhunaif’s opposition to Kumar’s motion for default judgment as a motion to set aside the clerk’s entry of default. Under Rule 55(c), the court considered whether the default was willful, whether Alhunaif had a potentially complete defense, and whether setting aside the default would prejudice Kumar.

The court found that Alhunaif’s default was willful. It relied on the delivery confirmations for the complaint and later court papers, Alhunaif’s contact with the court from the same email address used for service, his nearly six-month delay in responding, and his failure to explain why living abroad prevented him from receiving or responding to the electronic communications.

The court also found that Alhunaif had not shown a meritorious defense. It rejected his argument that his former diplomatic status deprived the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. Applying Second Circuit precedent, the court concluded that former diplomats do not retain immunity for private conduct outside their official diplomatic functions, and that the alleged household employment and treatment of Kumar were private acts. The court also rejected his challenge to service, explaining that its earlier order had already found the alternative service methods proper and that Alhunaif identified no controlling law or overlooked information warranting reconsideration. His general assertions that witnesses would contradict Kumar’s allegations were insufficient because they were not evidence of a complete defense.

The court did not decide whether Kumar had shown prejudice from the delay because it found both that Alhunaif’s default was willful and that he had not presented a meritorious defense. The court therefore denied Alhunaif’s motion for relief from default.

Default Judgment

The court granted Kumar’s motion for default judgment as to liability. It held that, accepting the complaint’s factual allegations as true and considering Kumar’s supporting affidavits, Kumar had established Alhunaif’s liability as a matter of law under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act for forced labor, trafficking for forced labor, document servitude, and conspiracy.

The court also found that Kumar had established liability under New York Labor Law for failure to pay minimum wage and overtime, late payment of wages, and failure to provide wage notices and wage statements. The ruling was limited to liability. The court referred damages—including possible liquidated damages, interest, attorney’s fees, and costs—and Kumar’s standing to pursue certain wage-notice and wage-statement claims to the assigned magistrate judge.

Motion to Dismiss

The court had construed Alhunaif’s opposition as also presenting a motion to dismiss. It denied that motion as untimely because Alhunaif filed it nearly five months after his deadline to answer or otherwise respond to the complaint. The court added that it had considered his dismissal arguments and rejected them as meritless.

Disposition

Judge Ho denied the motion for relief from default, granted the motion for default judgment as to liability, and denied the putative motion to dismiss as untimely. The court stated that a separate order would enter default judgment as to liability and that the matter would proceed to an inquest on damages.