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N.D. Cal.Procedural orderFiled Mar. 20, 2025

Cornejo v. Minglana

Judge
Jeffrey White
Docket
4:23-cv-05383
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
8
Civil RightsCivil ProcedureMotion to DismissPro Se
In one sentence

In Cornejo v. Minglana, Judge White granted dismissal of most claims as previously litigated, leaving an excessive-force claim for summary-judgment briefing.

Who this affects

Efrain Cornejo's retaliation, medical-care, and excessive-force claims against the defendants were affected. The court dismissed all claims except the Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim against T. Clayton; that remaining claim proceeds to the answer and possible summary-judgment stage.

What happened

In Cornejo v. Minglana, Efrain Cornejo, a prisoner representing himself, sued officials under a civil-rights law over alleged retaliation, denial of medical care, and force used during a cell extraction. The defendants asked the court to dismiss all claims except the claim that T. Clayton used excessive force.

The court ruled that the earlier round of this case involved the same claims and facts and had ended with dismissals that barred relitigation. It therefore dismissed every claim except the excessive-force claim against Clayton.

Judge Jeffrey White granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the other claims with prejudice and without permission to amend. The court ordered briefing on a possible summary-judgment motion for the remaining claim and directed Clayton to file an answer.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Cornejo v. Minglana · No. 4:23-cv-05383
Judge
Jeffrey White
Date
Mar. 20, 2025

Background

Efrain Cornejo, a California prisoner representing himself, brought a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against officials at Salinas Valley State Prison. He alleged that officials retaliated against him for a prior lawsuit, used excessive force during a cell extraction, and denied or delayed medical care after the incident. He alleged that T. Clayton kicked his upper torso and kicked his head into a gym door, and that other defendants participated in the extraction or related conduct.

The court took notice of records from Cornejo's earlier related proceeding in the Northern District of California. The court stated that the earlier case involved substantially the same claims. The earlier claims had been dismissed with prejudice, except for an excessive-force claim against one officer, who later obtained summary judgment. The earlier order also stated that Cornejo could file a new case against the officer identified as Doe No. 1 after learning that officer's identity. In this case, Cornejo identified that officer as T. Clayton.

Defendants' Motion

The defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal for failure to state a legally sufficient claim. They argued that all claims except the Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim against Clayton were barred by res judicata, also called claim preclusion. Cornejo did not dispute or address that argument in his opposition.

Court's Analysis

The court explained that claim preclusion generally prevents a party from pursuing claims that were raised or could have been raised in an earlier case. It requires an identity of claims, a final judgment on the merits, and privity between the parties, meaning a sufficient legal relationship or commonality of interests between the parties in the two cases.

The court found an identity of claims because both cases arose from the same alleged cell-extraction incident, the same alleged retaliation, and the same alleged denial of medical care. The additional allegations in this case—such as Cornejo's mental-health status and his allegation that he was taken to the infirmary after Minglana refused care—did not create a different factual basis.

The court found a final judgment on the merits because the earlier claims had been dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim or after summary judgment. It also found sufficient commonality of interests between the defendants in this case and the defendants in the earlier related proceeding, including officials alleged to have participated in the same retaliation or cell extraction. The court distinguished Clayton because the earlier proceeding had identified him only as Doe No. 1 and had not specifically indicated that the prior decision barred a later action against the officer once his identity was learned.

Ruling and Next Steps

The court granted the motion to dismiss. All claims except Cornejo's claim that Clayton used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment were dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend. The court said amendment would be futile because those claims were barred by claim preclusion. The court did not dismiss the excessive-force claim on that ground and stated that the complaint presented a legally cognizable claim against Clayton.

The court ordered Clayton to file an answer. It also ordered Clayton to file a summary-judgment motion by June 2, 2025, unless he believed the case could not be resolved through summary judgment. Cornejo's opposition would be due 28 days after service of the motion, and a reply would be due 14 days after service of the opposition. The court stated that no hearing would be held unless it later ordered one. It also directed that discovery requests be served on the opposing party or lawyer rather than filed with the court.

The authoritative version

Read the full 8-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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