Daywitt v. Gandhi

Background

Kenneth Daywitt has been civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP), operated by the Minnesota Department of Human Services, since 2009. After his transfer from the Moose Lake facility to the St. Peter facility in January 2022, he alleged that he could no longer fully practice Orthodox Judaism in the same way.

At Moose Lake, Daywitt participated in a Jewish group that provided holiday foods, visiting rabbis, streamed services, and other religious accommodations. He alleged that St. Peter had no established Jewish group because MSOP policy generally required six people to express interest in forming a spiritual group. He also alleged that he received inadequate Passover food in 2022 and went without food for eight days, had difficulty obtaining kosher Passover food in 2023, and was denied certain foods for other Jewish holidays. He further alleged limits on streamed religious services and printed religious-study materials.

The policy also stated that groups with fewer than six people could be considered. Daywitt did not allege that he applied for recognition of a smaller group or that MSOP denied such an application. He also acknowledged that the facility provided some alternatives, including allowing him to purchase his own Passover meals in 2023 and purchase religious materials instead of receiving materials printed from the internet.

Claims and procedural history

Daywitt asserted four counts against MSOP, the Minnesota Department of Human Services, and various officials in their individual and official capacities. He alleged violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Minnesota Constitution, including claims involving religious expression, equal protection, inhumane treatment, and free exercise of religion.

The defendants moved to dismiss. Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung recommended dismissing the complaint in its entirety. The recommendation proposed dismissing the RLUIPA, First Amendment, Minnesota free-exercise, and equal-protection claims without prejudice, and dismissing the substantive-due-process, individual-capacity, and official-capacity damages claims with prejudice. Daywitt objected. Because his objections were specific, the district court reviewed the challenged portions of the recommendation independently.

The court rejected the defendants’ claim-preclusion argument. It concluded that Daywitt’s claims involved individual allegations of constitutional violations that were not barred by earlier MSOP-related litigation.

Court’s analysis

RLUIPA and First Amendment claims. The court held that Daywitt had not adequately alleged a substantial burden on his ability to practice his religion. It found that the spiritual-group policy allowed an application for group status with fewer than six people, and Daywitt did not allege that he made such an application or that it was denied. Regarding Passover meals, the court relied on the complaint’s allegations that the facility allowed Daywitt to purchase other meals. The court dismissed the RLUIPA and First Amendment claims without prejudice.

Minnesota Constitution free-exercise claim. The court stated that it was likely without jurisdiction because Minnesota had not clearly waived sovereign immunity for this type of claim in federal court. The court also concluded that, even if the claim could be heard, Daywitt’s allegations were too vague and speculative to show that the policy burdened his religious practice. The claim was dismissed without prejudice.

Fourteenth Amendment claims. The court dismissed the substantive-due-process claims with prejudice because the First Amendment provides the specific constitutional protection for alleged interference with religious practice. The court dismissed the equal-protection claims without prejudice because Daywitt had not alleged that he was treated differently from similarly situated people based on religion. The court found that members of recognized religious groups were not similarly situated to Daywitt because his group had not obtained recognition, and it noted that the policy applied to all faiths on the same basis.

Individual-capacity claims. The court disagreed with the recommendation that these claims failed because Daywitt had not identified each official’s personal involvement. Reading the complaint liberally, the court found that he had connected particular defendants to particular practices. But the court concluded that the officials were protected by qualified immunity because Daywitt had not adequately alleged a constitutional violation. Because the underlying claims were dismissed without prejudice, the court modified the recommendation and dismissed the individual-capacity claims without prejudice rather than with prejudice.

Official-capacity damages claims. The court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred Daywitt’s damages claims against officials in their official capacities. It found no state waiver of immunity and no congressional abrogation. These claims were dismissed with prejudice.

Disposition

The court overruled Daywitt’s objections, adopted the report and recommendation as modified, granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and dismissed the complaint in its entirety. The RLUIPA, First Amendment, Minnesota free-exercise, equal-protection, and individual-capacity claims were dismissed without prejudice. The substantive-due-process claims and all claims for damages against official-capacity defendants were dismissed with prejudice. The order directed that judgment be entered accordingly.