Stein v. Town Of Greenburgh

Background

Kristin Stein sued the Town of Greenburgh and various police officials, asserting fourteen claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She alleged gender discrimination, sexual harassment, a hostile work environment, retaliation, unfair discipline, denial of equal protection and due process, and municipal liability. In an earlier order, the court dismissed four claims. Other defendants were later voluntarily dismissed, leaving the Town, Kobie Powell, Brian Matthews, Frank Farina, and Jeff Cerone as the remaining defendants when the summary-judgment motion was filed.

Stein’s allegations included a 2019 physical-contact incident involving Cerone, alleged delayed backup and ostracism on the midnight shift, investigations into a motor-vehicle accident and her leaving her post, an investigation into commendation requests, the handling of a workers’ compensation claim, and the alleged denial of restricted duty. Defendants sought summary judgment, which asks whether the evidence presents a genuine factual dispute requiring a trial and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law.

Hostile-Work-Environment, Discrimination, and Sexual-Harassment Claims

The court granted summary judgment on the Third and Eighth Claims, which asserted hostile work environment under Title VII and Section 1983. The Title VII claim based on the Cerone incident was untimely, and the court found that the evidence did not support treating the incident as part of a continuing violation. The Section 1983 claim based on Cerone’s conduct also failed because Stein and Cerone held the same rank and Stein did not show that Cerone acted using power granted by state authority.

The court also rejected the hostile-work-environment theory based on officers showing Stein obscene photographs. The Town and the police department had anti-harassment policies and training, and Stein had not reported the photographs before filing her federal workplace-discrimination complaint. The court further found that the alleged retaliatory conduct did not establish a sufficiently severe or pervasive sexually hostile environment.

The court granted summary judgment on the Fifth and Sixth Claims, which asserted gender and sexual-orientation discrimination and sexual harassment under Section 1983. It found those claims duplicative of the hostile-work-environment claims and noted that Stein did not respond to defendants’ argument that they were duplicative. The court also stated that the Sixth and Eighth Claims failed because they invoked Section 1983 without identifying a specific constitutional or statutory right.

Retaliation Claims

The Fourth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Claims asserted retaliation under Title VII, Section 1983, and the New York State Human Rights Law. The court found that Stein engaged in protected activity, including complaining about the Cerone incident and filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and that defendants knew about that activity.

The court found that Stein had not provided sufficient evidence that defendants denied her restricted duty, forced her to take unpaid leave, or delayed workers’ compensation paperwork. She also did not pursue her theory that she was assigned more frequently to “6 Post.” The court therefore granted summary judgment on the Title VII and Section 1983 retaliation claims to the extent they relied on those theories, and granted summary judgment on the New York State Human Rights Law retaliation claim, which was based only on the alleged denial of restricted duty.

The court denied summary judgment on the Title VII and Section 1983 retaliation claims to the extent they were based on three theories: treatment on the midnight shift, including delayed backup; the motor-vehicle-accident investigation and resulting Letters of Supervisory Notice; and the investigation of Stein’s commendation requests and resulting Letter of Supervisory Notice. The court found factual disputes about whether the midnight-shift treatment was retaliatory, whether Stein’s conduct in the accident amounted to misconduct that broke the causal connection, and whether the commendation investigation was selectively enforced as a pretext for retaliation. It found insufficient evidence of pretext regarding the investigation into Stein leaving her post and regarding her brother’s nonselection for the SWAT Team.

Other Claims and Individual Defendants

The court granted summary judgment on the Tenth Claim, which alleged equal-protection and due-process violations under Section 1983. The equal-protection theory based on a hostile work environment failed for the same reasons as the hostile-work-environment claims, and Stein did not respond to defendants’ due-process arguments.

The court granted summary judgment on the Eleventh Claim, which asserted municipal liability under Section 1983. Stein’s personal experiences with allegedly retaliatory investigations did not establish that an official Town policy or custom caused the alleged violations. The court also found that Stein had not shown that her brother was subjected to retaliation when he was not selected for the SWAT Team.

The court denied summary judgment on the Ninth Claim to the extent it was based on the three remaining retaliation theories: midnight-shift treatment, the motor-vehicle-accident investigation, and the commendation investigation. It otherwise granted summary judgment on that claim. The court granted summary judgment dismissing Matthews and Cerone as individual defendants because Matthews’s involvement concerned conduct the court found not actionable and Cerone was not involved in the alleged retaliation. The court denied summary judgment for Powell and Farina based on lack of personal involvement because the record showed their involvement in the challenged investigations and notices.

The court also declined to grant qualified immunity to Powell and Farina. Qualified immunity can protect government officials from damages liability unless they violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established. Because factual disputes remained about whether their investigations and notices were retaliatory, the court could not decide as a matter of law that they were protected by qualified immunity.

Disposition

Judge Philip M. Halpern granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The motion was granted as to the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Claims; granted as to specified theories supporting the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Claims; and granted to dismiss Matthews and Cerone as individual defendants. The motion was denied as to the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Claims based on the three remaining retaliation theories, as to Powell and Farina as individual defendants, and as to qualified immunity. Those remaining theories were ordered to proceed to trial, as appropriate, against the Town, Powell, and Farina.