P.V.J. v. Zuchowski

Background

P.V.J., whom the opinion identifies as a Mexican citizen, sought judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ (USCIS) denial of his application for a waiver of inadmissibility. The waiver was connected to his application for U nonimmigrant status, commonly called a U visa.

The opinion states that P.V.J. was attacked in California, robbed, had his car stolen, and was shot thirteen times. He survived and shared information about the perpetrator with investigating officers. Because of prior convictions and immigration violations, he needed a waiver to qualify for U nonimmigrant status. USCIS denied the waiver application and then denied the U visa petition. P.V.J. challenged the waiver denial and also sought to vacate the denial of his U visa petition.

The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim.

Jurisdictional analysis

The court explained that the Administrative Procedure Act generally creates a presumption that courts may review agency actions, but that presumption does not apply when a specific statute precludes review or when the agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.

The court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) removes jurisdiction to review immigration decisions whose authority is placed in the deciding agency’s discretion. It also concluded that the provision restoring jurisdiction for certain legal questions applies to petitions filed in an appropriate court of appeals, not to this district-court case.

P.V.J. had sought waivers under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(d)(3)(A)(ii) and 1182(d)(14). For the first provision, the court relied on binding Ninth Circuit precedent holding that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars judicial review of waiver decisions under that provision. The court rejected P.V.J.’s argument that the Supreme Court’s later decision in Wilkinson v. Garland undermined that precedent, explaining that Wilkinson addressed the jurisdiction-restoring provision rather than the jurisdiction-stripping provision at issue here.

For § 1182(d)(14), the court found that the statute’s language places the waiver decision in the agency’s discretion. The statute says the agency “may waive” inadmissibility when it considers doing so to be in the public or national interest. Relying on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, the court concluded that this language gives the agency broad discretion rather than a standard that courts can administer. The court therefore held that decisions under § 1182(d)(14) are also unreviewable.

Disposition

The court GRANTED the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). The court did not reach the defendants’ other arguments, and the order dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.