Phillips v. Banks

Background

Parents of eleven students with disabilities brought claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the New York City Department of Education (DOE) and its Chancellor in her official capacity. Melissa Aviles-Ramos had been substituted for former Chancellor David C. Banks. By the time of this opinion, claims involving four students had ended because the DOE had paid the outstanding balances, leaving disputes involving seven students.

The parents had obtained administrative orders requiring the DOE to fund tuition and related services at the International Institute for the Brain, commonly called iBrain. The remaining disputes concerned transportation and nursing costs. Both sides moved for summary judgment. Magistrate Judge Jennifer E. Willis recommended granting each motion in part and denying each motion in part. Both sides objected.

Rulings on exhaustion and individual claims

The court held that IDEA claims generally must be presented through both levels of New York’s administrative process: a hearing before an impartial hearing officer and an appeal to a State Review Officer. The parents of L.S. and E.B. had not appealed the relevant hearing officers’ orders. The court therefore held that it could not modify those orders to add relief that the hearing officers had not awarded.

For L.S., the administrative order required reimbursement for special transportation, not direct payment. Because the parents had not appealed that order and had not submitted documentation showing transportation payments, the court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, denied the parents’ motion as to that claim, and dismissed the claim without prejudice as not ripe.

For E.B., the administrative order required the DOE to provide or fund transportation involving a one-to-one travel nurse or paraprofessional, but it did not order funding for a one-to-one nurse at school. The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the school-nurse claim and dismissed that claim without prejudice because the parents had not exhausted their administrative remedies concerning the missing relief.

Transportation claims

For V.G., the court held that the transportation claim was not ripe. The DOE had acknowledged its obligation to pay, had reimbursed transportation costs for part of the relevant period, and represented that it would pay once accurate invoices were provided. Because the dispute depended on correcting an invoice naming error rather than a final refusal to pay, the court overruled the parents’ objection, granted summary judgment to the defendants on this issue, and dismissed the claim as not ripe. The conclusion section described the V.G. transportation claim as dismissed without prejudice.

For E.B., R.L., and W.R., the court held that the wording of the administrative orders was unclear about whether the DOE had to pay only for days the students actually attended school or for the full transportation contracts. The court overruled the parents’ objection and remanded E.B.’s case to IHO Weiserbs, R.L.’s case to IHO Cesaratto, and W.R.’s case to IHO Austin for further proceedings and clarification. The court also stated that E.B.’s transportation claim involving a travel nurse or paraprofessional should be remanded for clarification because the relevant wording was similarly unclear.

For M.C., the administrative order required the DOE to pay “any transportation costs” related to transporting M.C. to and from iBrain. Relying on its interpretation of that order, the court sustained the parents’ objection and granted their motion for summary judgment on M.C.’s transportation claim. The parents were directed to submit paperwork showing the terms of M.C.’s transportation contract so the DOE could process reimbursement.

Tuition claims and fees

The court adopted the recommendation to dismiss without prejudice the tuition claims for all students because the DOE had fully paid the tuition balances. It also dismissed without prejudice the transportation claims for C.B. and S.J.D. because those obligations had been paid or, as to S.J.D., the claim was no longer being pursued.

The court recognized that the parents were prevailing parties in the underlying administrative proceedings. However, because the opinion changed the recommended rulings concerning L.S. and E.B., and because the attorneys’ fee issue had not been fully briefed in light of the court’s rulings, the court expressed no view on the extent of any fee entitlement. The parents may file a motion for reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under a schedule to be set by Judge Willis. The court stated that it would enter its final judgment after resolving any fee motion.

Disposition

The court adopted the Report and Recommendation in part. It sustained and overruled the parents’ objections in part and sustained the defendants’ objections. It dismissed without prejudice the tuition claims for all students, E.B.’s one-to-one school-nurse claim, and the transportation claims for C.B., S.J.D., V.G., and L.S.; granted the parents’ motion for summary judgment on M.C.’s transportation claim; and remanded the transportation matters involving E.B., R.L., and W.R. for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.