Nkansah v. United States
- Kimba Wood
- 1:18-cv-10230
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 12
In Nkansah v. United States, Judge Wood granted the Government’s partial pleadings motion and denied Nkansah’s request to amend.
Felix Nkansah and the United States; the ruling dismissed Nkansah’s intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress and prima-facie-tort claims with prejudice, while the opinion identifies assault and battery as the other remaining claims.
What happened
In Nkansah v. United States, Felix Nkansah sued the United States over alleged mistreatment while he was in Immigration and Customs Enforcement custody. The Government asked the court to rule against his claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and prima facie tort based on the existing pleadings, and Nkansah asked to amend those claims.
The court ruled that Nkansah had not adequately alleged either claim. It found that the alleged threat to transfer him far away and the later transfer did not meet the demanding standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that he did not provide enough detail about actual losses for a prima facie tort claim. The court also found that amending the complaint would be too late and would not fix these problems.
Judge Kimba M. Wood granted the Government’s motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, dismissed both claims with prejudice, and denied Nkansah’s cross-motion to amend. The opinion states that assault and battery were the other two remaining claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
The detailed version
- Nkansah v. United States · No. 1:18-cv-10230
- Kimba Wood
- Mar. 28, 2025
Background
Felix Nkansah sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act over alleged mistreatment while he was in Immigration and Customs Enforcement custody. He alleged that, after making complaints about his detention conditions and access to legal calls and funds, officers threatened to move him to a distant facility and then transferred him. He further alleged that officers assaulted him during the transfer, restrained him, transported him with a hood over his head, and that he later did not receive adequate treatment for nerve injuries.
At the time of this ruling, four claims remained: assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and prima facie tort. The Government moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) for partial judgment on the pleadings on the intentional-infliction and prima-facie-tort claims. A Rule 12(c) motion uses the same standard as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Nkansah opposed the motion and cross-moved for permission to file a proposed amended complaint.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Under New York law, an intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim requires extreme and outrageous conduct, an intent to cause or disregard of a substantial probability of causing severe emotional distress, a connection between the conduct and the injury, and severe emotional distress.
The court held that the proposed amended complaint did not adequately plead this claim. It found that the allegations describing the threat to transfer Nkansah to a distant location and carrying out that threat did not approach the required level of conduct “beyond all possible bounds of decency.” The court also held that Nkansah relied only on conclusory statements, rather than specific facts, to allege that the Government intended to cause severe emotional distress. The court dismissed the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim with prejudice.
Prima Facie Tort
Under New York law, a prima-facie-tort claim requires intentional harm, special damages, no excuse or justification, and conduct that would otherwise be lawful. Special damages must identify actual losses with sufficient detail; an unexplained lump-sum demand is not enough.
The court held that Nkansah did not adequately plead special damages. Although the proposed amended complaint requested $3,132,574 for lost economic opportunities, it did not itemize or calculate the alleged losses, and it did not explain how the alleged conduct caused them. The court dismissed the prima-facie-tort claim with prejudice.
Motion to Amend
The court denied Nkansah’s cross-motion for leave to amend. It noted that the proposed amended complaint was procedurally improper, repeated claims that had already been dismissed, and was submitted after more than three and a half years of discovery. The court found undue delay because Nkansah knew the relevant facts but waited more than six years to seek amendment. It also found amendment futile because the proposed changes did not cure the defects in either claim and presented a new intentional-infliction theory based on the earlier transfer threat.
Disposition
Judge Kimba M. Wood granted the Government’s motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and denied Nkansah’s cross-motion to amend the complaint. The court dismissed the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress and prima-facie-tort claims with prejudice and directed the Clerk of Court to close the pending motion.
Read the full 12-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.