Lyon v. Paramount Global

Background

Possible Productions hired Jennifer Lyon in October 2020 as the Health and Safety Supervisor, also called the COVID-19 Compliance Supervisor, for the limited series Dexter: New Blood. Lyon reported to Adam Brightman and Bill Carraro. Her responsibilities included helping staff the health and safety department, implementing COVID-19 safety requirements, and contributing to a document called the Long Form, which described how the production would address COVID-19.

Lyon experienced staffing problems, disagreements with Brightman and other employees, and difficulty completing the Long Form. She complained to Human Resources about Brightman and later submitted an internal complaint alleging a hostile work environment. The company investigated the complaint, interviewed Lyon, Brightman, and 14 other people, and concluded that Lyon’s discrimination claims could not be substantiated. The production terminated Lyon on February 26, 2021, after it had already decided to replace her.

Lyon brought claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Massachusetts Law Against Discrimination, and Massachusetts wage law. She also alleged breach of contract. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims and sought sanctions based on Lyon’s alleged failure to preserve cellphone data and text messages.

Sex and Age Discrimination

The court applied the three-step burden-shifting framework used for discrimination claims based on circumstantial evidence. Lyon could establish the initial elements of her sex-discrimination claim: she was a woman, was qualified for the position, and suffered termination. But the court found that she did not provide sufficient evidence that her termination occurred under circumstances suggesting sex discrimination.

Lyon argued that William Perkins was a comparable male employee who received more favorable treatment. The court found that Lyon and Perkins could be considered similarly situated in some respects, but that the undisputed evidence showed Lyon faced more serious performance and conduct concerns. The evidence included staffing problems, complaints from employees, confrontations, and Lyon’s difficulty completing job responsibilities. Lyon did not provide comparable evidence about Perkins. The court also found that Brightman’s alleged rude or dismissive treatment did not support an inference of sex discrimination because Lyon testified that he could behave that way regardless of gender and never made derogatory comments about her gender.

The court said Lyon barely met the minimal initial burden by pointing to Brightman’s instruction that she report to Perkins and run matters by him, even though Lyon believed Perkins had less experience. But defendants provided a nondiscriminatory reason for the termination—poor performance, staffing failures, and recurring confrontations—and Lyon did not provide enough evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that reason was a pretext for sex discrimination.

For age discrimination, Lyon relied on Perkins as a comparator, but Perkins was older than Lyon and therefore was also in the protected age group. The court found no evidence that Brightman’s conduct or Lyon’s termination was based on age. Lyon also did not show that age was the necessary cause of her termination, as required under the age-discrimination statute. The court therefore granted summary judgment on both federal discrimination claims.

Retaliation

The court rejected Lyon’s argument that her January 5, 2021 conversation with Human Resources was protected activity. Although she complained about Brightman’s treatment, the court found that the conversation did not sufficiently suggest that she was opposing unlawful discrimination. The court also rejected Lyon’s argument that her authority to enforce COVID-19 rules was protected activity because that work did not involve complaining about discrimination.

The court found that Lyon’s February 15 internal complaint did qualify as protected activity. However, the production had already decided to replace her before she sent that complaint. Because the termination decision had already been set in motion, the later termination could not support a retaliation claim. The court also found that Brightman’s earlier conduct and the timing of the termination did not establish retaliation.

Hostile-Work-Environment and Massachusetts Discrimination Claims

The court treated Lyon’s federal and state hostile-work-environment claims as abandoned because her opposition to summary judgment did not address them. The court also treated all claims under the Massachusetts Law Against Discrimination as abandoned because Lyon did not discuss that statute or explain why those claims should proceed. Summary judgment was therefore granted on those claims.

Wages and Contract

Lyon claimed that defendants violated Massachusetts wage laws and her employment agreement by failing to pay her for all time worked, including overtime and work on Thanksgiving. The court found no genuine factual dispute supporting those claims. The record showed that Lyon was paid for additional work during the ramp-up period and for specified sixth and seventh workdays. Lyon did not identify particular unpaid days or weeks, and she did not provide evidence that defendants knew about unpaid overtime.

The court also found that Lyon had not shown a breach of the employment agreement. For purposes of the claim, the court treated her Deal Memo as a contract, but found no evidence that defendants failed to pay her for all hours worked. The Deal Memo did not provide for holiday pay, and Lyon did not identify language in the COVID-19 Return to Work Agreement that entitled her to Thanksgiving holiday pay or displaced the Deal Memo’s payment terms.

Sanctions and Disposition

Defendants sought an adverse inference or dismissal as a sanction for Lyon’s failure to preserve text messages from the time she worked on the production. Because the court granted summary judgment on all of Lyon’s claims, it found that any sanctions ruling would have no practical effect. The court therefore denied the sanctions motion as moot. The court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, denied their sanctions motion as moot, directed the Clerk to terminate the relevant motions, and closed the case.