Stern v. Highland Lake Homeowners Association

Background

Mendel Stern, Yoel Fried, Fraida M. Fried, and Melech Krauss sued Highland Lake Homeowners Association, Arthur Edwards, Inc., Archway Property Management, Inc., and several individual defendants. They asserted religious-discrimination claims under Sections 3604(b) and 3617 of the Fair Housing Act and related claims under New York Executive Law § 296. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants targeted them because they are Hasidic Jews and sought to discourage Hasidic Jews from moving into or remaining in Highland Lake Estates.

The challenged conduct included the homeowners association’s restrictions on renting homes, temporary religious structures, commercial activity and home showings on Sundays, “For Sale” signs, houses of worship, and other alleged individualized conduct. The plaintiffs also described fines for violations of the association’s rules, confrontations or questioning by individual defendants, alleged interference with home showings, vandalism by unidentified people, and other incidents.

Legal standard and issues

The defendants moved for summary judgment, a procedure that permits judgment without a trial when there is no genuine dispute about a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court applied the burden-shifting framework used for intentional-discrimination claims. Under that framework, the plaintiffs first had to present evidence supporting a basic showing of discrimination. The defendants could then identify legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions, after which the plaintiffs had to show that those reasons were a pretext, or not the real reasons.

For the Fair Housing Act claims at issue, the court explained that the plaintiffs had to show harassment sufficiently severe and pervasive to create a hostile housing environment, that the harassment occurred because of their protected religious identity, and that the defendants could legally be held responsible for the conduct. The court stated that the same standard and burden-shifting analysis applied to the New York state-law claims.

Court’s analysis

The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently connect the homeowners association’s governing documents to discrimination against Hasidic Jews. Regarding the rental ban, the defendants presented evidence that the ban had been considered before Hasidic residents moved into the community, applied to all residents, and was adopted by a two-thirds vote before any of the individual defendants served on the association’s board. The court found that the plaintiffs offered only conclusory statements suggesting a discriminatory connection and did not dispute that Stern and Krauss violated the rental rules.

The court also considered the restrictions on temporary religious structures, Sunday commercial activity, Sunday home showings, “For Sale” signs, security gates, and houses of worship. It noted that restrictions on temporary structures had later been lifted and accommodations made; Sunday home-showing restrictions had been modified; and the defendants offered nondiscriminatory reasons for other policies, including reducing traffic, aesthetic concerns, and residential zoning. The court found that the plaintiffs did not provide sufficient evidence to rebut those explanations or show that the policies burdened them because of their religion.

Considering the alleged individualized conduct together with the association’s rules, the court held that the plaintiffs had not shown conduct that was severe and pervasive rather than isolated or sporadic. The court viewed the evidence in the plaintiffs’ favor, as required at summary judgment, but concluded that they still had not made the required basic showing of discrimination. The court further stated that, even if they had made that showing, the defendants had met their limited burden of producing legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged policies.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in its entirety with prejudice. It directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the motion, terminate the action, and enter judgment in favor of the defendants. The opinion also states that an earlier order had discontinued related claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act asserted by other plaintiffs; those claims were not part of the claims decided in this opinion.