Meyer v. Hegseth

Background

Earl Robert Meyer sued Peter B. Hegseth, in his official capacity as Secretary of Defense, and Daniel P. Driscoll, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Army. The case originally challenged the Army Board for the Correction of Military Records’ denial of Meyer’s application for a Purple Heart Medal. Meyer alleged that the denial was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act and sought a declaration, a remand for reconsideration, an award of the medal, and attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act.

Before the court ruled on Meyer’s motion for summary judgment, the parties agreed that the court should vacate the Board’s denial, send the matter back to the Board for reconsideration, and allow Meyer to submit additional evidence. On remand, the Board reversed its earlier decision and awarded Meyer the Purple Heart. The parties then agreed to dismiss the case but continued to dispute Meyer’s request for attorney’s fees and costs.

Attorney’s Fees

Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, a successful party in an action against the United States may receive reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses unless the government’s position was substantially justified or special circumstances would make an award unfair. The court explained that a successful party must obtain some relief on the claim and a material change in the parties’ legal relationship.

The court held that Meyer was a successful party. The court-approved remand gave him nearly the same relief he had requested in his complaint: cancellation of the Board’s denial and reconsideration of his application. Although the result came through a stipulation, the court found that its order approving the relief supplied the required judicial approval.

The court also held that the defendants’ position was not substantially justified. It found that Meyer had submitted evidence of his military service, his statement that he was injured by mortar shrapnel in Korea in June 1951, hospitalization records, medical records concerning pain in his left thigh, and later medical records concerning continuing shrapnel injuries. The court concluded that the Board had repeated an error identified in an earlier decision involving another veteran by treating incomplete medical records as a reason to deny relief. The court also found that the evidence on remand was not meaningfully different and that the Board’s changed position did not make the earlier position substantially justified.

Amount Awarded

Meyer’s attorneys reported 218.4 hours of work: 136.8 hours by Alan Anderson and 81.6 hours by L. Reagan Florence. The court found the claimed hours reasonable, including time spent preparing the fee application. It noted that the attorneys did not seek compensation for about 50 hours spent on the Board application process or about 20 hours of preliminary research.

The Equal Access to Justice Act ordinarily sets a $125 hourly cap, subject to an increase based on inflation. The court calculated an inflation-adjusted rate of $251.72. It found that Anderson’s experience and expertise justified a rate above the statutory cap, but reduced his requested rate from $450 to $350 because Meyer acknowledged that similarly situated attorneys in the area charged $350 per hour for similar work. The court used the inflation-adjusted rate of $251.72 for Florence’s work.

Using those rates and hours, the court calculated attorney’s fees of $68,420.35. Because the defendants did not contest the reasonableness of Meyer’s costs, the court awarded the full $1,248.93 in costs.

Order

Judge John R. Tunheim ordered that Meyer’s motion for attorney’s fees be granted in part and denied in part. The order awarded Meyer $68,420.35 in attorney’s fees and $1,248.93 in costs, and directed that judgment be entered accordingly.